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Chapter 1: Introduction:
1.1 Introduction:
After the economic fallout caused the Second World War, the Bretton Woods
Institutions were founded in 1944 by the three major global powers in aims to launch a
post-war economic mandate grounded upon concepts of cooperation and consensual
decision-making regarding global economic relations and particularly trade. (Felder,
2009) The sole purpose of those institutions at the time was to promote economic
growth to help restore the crushed postwar economy through adopting a multilateral
agenda to ensure the inclusion of all the involved members in order to overcome
pervious trade battles and global economic crises. Although the founding parties of the
Bretton Wood Institutions each had a side agenda of their own which motivated them
to bring this new economic system to life, yet they had a united front to intertwine
individualistic economies to move towards an integrated global economy as a means to
avoid a breakout of another world war. While the EU members mainly focused on the
recovery and reconstruction of their states, the UK was more focused on the means to
obstruct another relapse of US economic isolation, meanwhile the US was more
determined to establish its presence through aid and side payments to combat the
widespread of communism. (Eichengreen & Kenen, 1994)
The World Bank was mainly founded to finance restructuring and developing
projects in war-torn economies by improving the trade facility of recipient countries.
The International Monetary Fund however was established to mainly maintain and
facilitate a steady environment for global trade by unifying its member’s monetary
policies though conserving a stable exchange rate policy, while offering provisional
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lending facilities to states facing disequilibria in their balance of payments.
(Eichengreen & Kenen, 1994)
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international economic system
in the 1970s, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) altered their agenda from
maintaining a global economic order to focusing their support on states who face
macroeconomic challenges. However, it was not until after the 1982 debt crisis that
those organizations launched a series of structural adjustment programs, aimed at
aiding countries address macroeconomic imbalances such as payments disequilibria.
(Eichengreen & Kenen, 1994)
The shift in the policy mandate of the Bretton Woods Institutions became
prominent after the blowout of The Washington Consensus, a list made up of ten
monetary policies that John Williamson had detected were becoming more mainstream
in Latin American states in 1989, which consequently were outdating the 1950’s
monetary policies first introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions. According to
Williamson (2008) the policy change observations was assembled to be discussed in a
conference hosted by The Institute for International Economics, to shed light on the
success of the new policy adaptations paving the route lagging developing countries
should peruse to achieve economic development and growth. Although Williamson
(2008), intended to name this list ‘Universal Convergence’ to better represent the
outline of the observed policies, but since Washington based institutions such as the
US Department of Treasury, The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
reached a consensus on adopting these widely accepted (by OECD member states)
policy prescriptions the list became widely known as the Washington Consensus.
(Williamson, 2008)
The ten reforms that constituted John Williamson’s (2008) list were:
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1.

‘Financial Discipline’: This policy reform addressed large deficits that

resulted in disequilibria in the balance of payments and high inflation that primarily
affected the poor because the rich could deposit their capital abroad. (Williamson,
2008)
2.

‘Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities’: This policy reform

addressed the issue of public expenditure, for Williamson (2008), it called upon
major cuts of public on non-merit subsidies to allow for an increased capital
allocation by the public sector to spend on infrastructure, and improved education
and health facilities.
3.

Tax Reform’: This point aimed at reforming the taxation regime in

countries to combine a wide-ranging tax base with moderate marginal tax rates.
(Williamson, 2008)
4.

‘Liberalizing Interest Rates’: For this specific point although

Williamson (2008) promotes market determined interest rates yet he specifically
stresses on the importance of prudential regulation on the financial liberalization
process.
5.

‘A Competitive Exchange Rate’: This policy reform called upon the

establishment of an intermediate regime’ of exchange rate policy to ensure that a
countries’ currency is not overvalued nor undervalued. Such policy hence implies a
grey area regime, which doesn’t firmly fix nor free floats its currency. (Williamson,
2008)
6.

Trade Liberalization’: Williamson (2008) had observed that the

globalization of trade, through the lowering of quantitative trade restrictions and
tariffs, had a positive impact on economic development in Latin American countries,
only when executed moderately.
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7.

‘Liberalization of Inward FDI’: This specific policy reform called upon

removing the barriers that obstruct the entry of foreign firms in local markets, it is
important to note however that Williamson (2008) stressed that this does not include
nor entail a complete liberalization of the capital account.
8.

‘Privatization’: Williamson (2008) addresses the issue of state

enterprises in this policy reform, he promotes that the process of privatization brings
benefits in terms of improved service coverage when executed properly here the
privatized enterprise is ether sold into a competitive market or is properly regulated.
If the process is executed in an alternative method Williamson (2008) claims that it
becomes a very corrupt procedure that hands over assets to a favored elite for a
fraction of its actual worth.
9.

‘Deregulation’: This policy reform addresses the easing of barriers

placed to allow for a smother entry and exist of foreign firms in the local market.
(Williamson, 2008) It does not however target the abolishment of regulations and
barriers associated with safety and environmental measures, or to manage prices in
non-competitive industries.
10.

‘Property Rights’: Williamson (2008) concluded his list with this final

reform to ensure that the informal sector had access to obtain and secure property
rights at an acceptable cost.
This agenda shift also imposed a cardinal shift in the scope of the institutions’
clientele, with developing countries becoming the center of their field of action.
Subsequently new lending facilities emerged with the transference of the recipient
cluster, to introduce fresh adjustment policies (Dreher, 2006). Those administrative
arrangements can be divided into two main groups – concessional and nonconcessional loans – each of which include sub programs that range from short,
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medium to long term lending facilities. Recipient countries then have to adhere and
comply with the structural adjustment policies in order to secure tranches of the loan
(Dreher, 2006).
Although the programs are different in terms of their settlement rates, payment
plans, as well as their duration and size, it is important to highlight that the core of both
concessionary and non-concessionary programs incorporate structural measures that
are designed promote growth to pave the way to economic prosperity. Conditionality,
as imbedded in those loans, refers to limitations and conditions that lender institutions
formally envision as a tool to ensure that the beneficiary countries’ government would
use the funds effectively, to eradicate distortions in the balance of payments, liberalize
trade, reform the public sector through privatization, and enforce currency deregulation
(Dreher & Vaubel, 2004)
Williamson (2008) however argues that the Bretton Wood Institutions have
been adopting the ‘Washington Consensus” policy reforms under their interpretation
which mainly deviates with the intended policy reforms he called upon in three main
key points. The differences in policy agenda over time have proved to be harmful to
recipient states as advocated by Gore (2000) in his research study, where he claimed
that once the attention started to shift from focusing on rebuilding what the World
Wars had shattered the main global focus began to move towards performance oriented
results using various standards to measure performance in recipient states. Debates
regarding the integrity and the effectiveness of the Washington Consensus started to
arise when recipient countries showed underperformance, after ranked based on how
well they were preforming in different developing sectors. (Gore, 2000)
According to Gore (2000) and Felder (2009), the mainstream debate that
criticized the effectiveness of the implementation of the Washington Consensus mainly
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promoted that the westernized policy agenda that was partially influenced by the
neoliberal theory namely undermined local governments’ standing since they imposed
policies that served the interest of capitalist developed economies at the cost of human
development in third world countries. Although this may be a valid argument
presented by several studies as will be discussed in the literature review (section 1.2),
yet it is important to highlight that Williamson (2008) redirects such criticism to the
three deviations in the policy agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions and namely the
International Monetary Fund started to adopt, claiming that they bear a direct and
increasing role behind main crisis occurrences and under performance in recipient
developing economies. (Williamson, 2008)
The first policy deviation that Williamson (2008) had warned about was the
general call for a strict policy reform to curb fiscal deficits in developing countries by
decreasing public expenditure as a whole, when on the contrary what the Washington
Consensus called for was the idea of re-ordering public expenditure priorities to ensure
a proper allocation of resources for the needed human development sectors such as
health and education. The second policy deviation that the IMF mandate adopted was
the coercion of recipient countries to free float their currencies through conditions
imbedded in their lending facilities, instead of adopting an intermediate exchange
regime to ensure local currencies were not over or under valued and instead were
traded at their true value. The third and final deviation that Williamson (2008)
attributes the failure of the IMF mandate to is policy reform that calls for the complete
liberalization of capital account in their client states, despite the fact that the
Washington Consensus specifically warned against such policy reform to protect
developing economies from capital flight. (Williamson, 2008)
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This thesis project will therefore look into the effects of policy conditions on
dependent states. Discussed in the literature review it appears that structural
adjustment-lending facilities have various performance outcomes on different
development sectors in recipient countries. Despite the positive outcomes in some
developmental sectors, as will be discussed in section 1.2; it became apparent that
economic growth, which was one of the positive outcomes of IFI lending facilities, had
a direct role in increasing inequality as suggested by Cingano (2014). This was
particularly the case if one tries to assess how much this ‘economic growth’ had
improved the lively hood of the poorest segment of the populace. Such realization
ultimately started to breed the grounds of the research puzzle for this paper, since IFI
funding facilities had some positive outcomes on growth, to what extent did this
growth actually induce better income equality, and therefore actually improving the
livelihood of the poorest segment of the society.
This led to the narrowing of the scope of this research to focus mainly on
identifying if the three main pillars of policy reforms (discussed in section 2.1.I) have a
direct impact on income inequality. The conceptual approach of this research will
hence be portrayed by presenting how the research puzzle became evident through
looking into the scholarly work that was published by other researchers in this field of
study. Below part 1.2 discusses general debates regarding IFI funding and their impact
whether it was positive or negative on several developmental indicators, those
indicators were then narrowed down to income inequality and the three main pillars of
policy reforms which are extensively discussed in the conceptual framework (section
2.1.I).
This research aims at digging deeper into debates presented in section 2.1.I and
contribute to the existing research by looking at the effects of the policy adjustment
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conditionality on income distribution patterns in Colombia, Egypt and Turkey. It will
also be of interest to assess whether the levels of inequality the case studies are
experiencing is attributed to the structural adjustment programs they sought out or preexisting country features mentioned in section 2.1.II.

1.2 Literature Review:
Since International Financial Institutions have become key players on the
global level, their mandates and operations have had a substantial impact on other
actors in the system. There have been several ongoing debates amongst scholars
regarding the effects of lending programs put forward by those organizations on
recipient countries.
I.

Impact of lending and conditionality on growth and democratization:
Especially since their shift after the 1982 debt crisis, preliminary research

demonstrates that the impact of IFI mandates and lending on development is
problematic. Some scholars argued that such lending facilities have restricted policy
space, to the point where third world countries are not able to adopt the needed
measures to secure the welfare of the population, and hence properly develop (Chang
2006: Dornan 2017). Others have also argued that such lending programs indirectly
facilitate the spread of non-democratic regimes. This occurs as a result of the IFI’s
donor preferences, which are in turn influenced by how compliant different political
regimes are to the institutions’ policy reform conditions. (Dreher, 2006) Some studies
have even taken it a step further in that direction, using econometric analysis to suggest
that IFIs are hurting middle and low-income countries by creating a neo-colonial world
order, through debt dependency. (Bradshaw and Huang 1991: Chang 2006)

Farag 12
Extremely distorted research outcomes are portrayed in Table 2 regarding the
extent to which those organizations have managed to achieve their mandate objectives.
Dreher (2006) renders a list (Table 2) where he presents the findings of other scholarly
work published on that subject showing that even when scholars utilized different
research approaches that findings were not supportive of IFIs in regards of those
institutions achieving their mandate objectives. On the contrary the list which is
presented below in Table 2 shows that if IFI funding did not have a direct impact on
decreasing economic growth then had no effect on that matter, while the results that
showed that IFI Funding facilities had a positive impact on economic growth were
very slight, despite the different research approaches different scholars used to test for
that matter.
Graham and Dane (2017) focused on 66 low-income countries, which they
studied from 1989-2008, and found that concessional lending facilities to low income
countries have a positive correlation with the rate of economic growth. On the other
hand quantitative studies by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Easterly (2005) and
Dreher (2006) employed time-series research methods and cross country data analysis
to assess the correlation between economic growth rates and the number of programs
developing countries undertook. Their findings conclude that economic policies
embedded in both concessionary and non-concessionary loans are inappropriate for
developing countries, eventually describing international lending facilities as
impacting negatively on both growth and development. Which is why recipients
participating in such programs experience negative effects on their economic growth,
especially in the short run, when compared with similar developing countries that
choose not to participate. Table 1 from Easterly’s (2005) research shows that a twenty
five countries out of the total thirty five countries in the sample used, became eligible
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for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Seventeen of which were highly
dependent on financial assistance, while the remaining eight were exposed to low
adjustment lending.

Table 1 (Easterly, 2005, p. p: 10)

Table 2: IFI lending and Economic growth (Dreher, 2006, p. 773)
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II.

Impact on poverty reduction and inequality:
Even if we assumed that these programs have a positive impact on economic

growth, such outcome would be positive only if it results in the improvement of the
living standards of the population; one could argue it is only then that it could actually
be termed as development.
Since one of the conditions often stipulated by IFIs is privatization of public
assets and limitations on public spending by the government, further research was
required to understand the effects of those limitations on the physical quality of life.
However, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. A study by Nooruddin and
Simmons (2006) using cross-national time series analysis finds that lending programs
shrink social expenditures in health and education sectors, which are of great
importance to the lower class. On the other hand another study by Clements, Gupta and
Nozaki (2013) looks at 140 countries over the period of 1985-2009, finding that
spending in the health and education sectors have risen at a faster pace than in
developing countries as a whole, during lending facility programs.
While Bradshaw and Huang (1991) argue that international lending packages
do not have a clear effect on the physical quality of life of the population, Hajro and
Joyce (2009) analyze the effects of both concessionary and non-concessionary lending
facilities on poverty. Their study pays close attention to infant mortality, and the
Human Development Index in 82 countries during the period 1985-2000, in relation to
economic growth rate and the type of loans undertaken by the recipient country. Their
findings suggest that lending facilities have no substantial impact on poverty, since
results show that economic growth as a result of concessionary programs has a positive
correlation with a higher HDI and lower infant mortality.
Post assessing the impact of aid conditionality on human development on a
macro-level by observing its causal effect on the HDI, lead us to consider assessing it
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on a micro-level, specifically income distribution and poverty. For instance, statistical
evidence from a report that was published by the OECD in 2014 point to an inverse
correlation between levels of inequality and economic growth, which is especially
evident in developing countries. (Cingano, 2014) Since currency devaluation is at the
heart of conditionality and for instance according to Bradshaw and Huang (1991)
devaluation leads to inflation, scholars like Easterly and Fischer (2001) conclude that
such devaluation has a clear-cut negative impact on the poor segment of the
population. It was compelling to study the effects of such conditionality policies,
which are imbedded in financial assistance, on the levels of poverty and income
distribution within recipient countries.
Several other scholars studied the effects of such conditionality policies which
are imbedded in financial assistance on the levels of poverty and income distribution
within recipient countries. Garuda (2000) employs a cross-country database study
covering 39 countries from 1975-1991, measuring the effects of 58 lending programs
on the Gini Coefficient and income of the poorest segment of the population. Findings
of the analysis show, that recipients of the programs face severe deterioration in
incomes of the poor, as well as income distribution. These findings are specifically
significant when compared with non-participant countries. The recent multivariate
regression analysis by Forster, et al. (2019), covering 135 states under structural
adjustment programs from the period 1980-2014, finds that four main areas of policy
adjustment conditionality create detrimental effects on inequality, which emerge one
year post the initiation of borrowing programs and continue in the medium term - up to
three years. (Forster, Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, & King, 2019)
Research by Oberdabernig (2013), covering 86 middle and low-income
countries from the period 1982-2009, finds that similar to Garuda (2000), lending
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facilities do indeed have unfavorable effects on income inequality and poverty as
portrayed in Table 3. Median figures in Table 3 display that countries, which received
IFI funding, show highest poverty ratios before and during the lending facility. On the
other hand, poverty is the lowest for countries that did not opt for structural adjustment
programs. Yet it is important to note that Oberdabernig (2013) findings also highlight
that such effects disappear in the long run after the end of the programs.

Table 3 Poverty gaps and headcount ratios by program participation status
(Oberdabernig, 2013, p. p:119)
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1.3 Research Outline:
Table 4

Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6

Introduction & Literature Review
Conceptual Framework & Methodology
First Case Study: Colombia
Second Case Study: Egypt
Third Case Study: Turkey
Conclusion

Chapter 2 will be composed of the conceptual framework to discuss in detail
the 3 main policy reforms, which are imbedded in the structural adjustment loans
of International Financial Institutions. This chapter will also discuss the two preexistent country features, which may have an effect on the endogenous variable. By
doing so the research will have identified all the variables needed to be later utilized as
analytical tools to test the research questions and hypotheses which are presented after
the conceptual framework section.
After establishing of the variables and their indicators the methodology will then
portray the research approach as well as the materials used to measure the impact of
IFI loans on inequality in relation to pre-existent country features. This section will
also provide an explanation for the selection process of the case studies
Chapters three, four and five will then be addressing the three selected case
studies, each to their own. Yet they will be composed of the same features, where each
chapter will begin with a brief about each country; introducing the broad issues of the
case study, this section will also have a brief segment that portrays the specific time
frame analysis. Followed by the second section of these chapters, which will have a
detailed explanation of the pre-existent country features. Policy reforms induced by
IFI’s will then be discussed depending on the types of programs the country opted to
go under, here the three main pillars of conditionality will be discussed in relation to
the possible effects. The final section of these chapters will then cross-analyze the
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number and size of loans the subject state received, with the endogenous variables
before, during, and after the loans in order to assess if funding facilities provided by
the IMF have a direct impact on inequality patterns in Colombia, Egypt and Turkey.
The sixth and final chapter will draw a conclusion based on the findings of the
previous three chapters, highlighting any analytical relations (if they do indeed exist)
and therefore verifying or falsifying the hypotheses mentioned above.
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework & Methodology:
2.1 Conceptual Framework:
As the analysis above has shown, it can be argued that economic growth has a
detrimental effect on inequality, as suggested for instance by Cingano (2014). This is
particularly the case if one focuses on the composition of this economic growth with
regards to how much it helps human development sectors that in turn improves the
lively hood of the poorest segments of the society. In turn, according to Oberdabernig
(2013), it can also be added that, economic inequality has a negative impact on
development. From 1988 to 2011 inequality levels have been on the rise within
roughly two thirds of all countries. This time frame simultaneously marks the span of
policy reform intervention carried out by IFIs in developing countries (Forster,
Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, & King, 2019, p. :84).
As a result, most scholars have highlighted the adverse effects of distortions in
the distribution of income on socioeconomic and sociopolitical developmental aspects
in emerging economies. Yet it remains unclear if those distortions are induced by the
conditionality attached to financial assistance, or are they pre-existent and worsened by
the rise of crises. According to Garuda (2000) the worsening levels of poverty in
developing countries are mostly attributed to the structural adjustment lending facilities
that bring about harsh policy reform conditions. Their argument focuses on criticizing
the structure of lending facilities, arguing that the loans are designed to focus on
declines in aggregate consumer demand, fiscal limitations, and external balance - all of
which are implemented at the cost of the poorer segments of the economy (Garuda,
2000). IFI program reforms that restrict government expenditure and enforce external
sector amendments which mainly include liberalizing trade and floating the recipient
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countries’ local currency, while including financial sector reforms, could all have a
direct impact on the increase of poverty and income inequality in developing countries.
The following sections will review the debates on these three key pillars of IFI
conditionality.
I.

Policy Conditionality Debate:
i.

Government Expenditure:
Restricting government expenditure is one of the primary pillars of stabilization

programs, sponsored by IFIs. Conditionality in this policy sector is primarily aimed at
limiting the size of Government spending as well as the procurement of new foreign
debt, in order to fix payments disequilibria. The problem arises in this segment
depending on the methodology to reduce the recipient country’s fiscal deficit. The
approach to curb deficit in this case would entail cuts in government spending which
include but are not limited to, health and education expenditure reductions, as well as
outlay subsidized essential goods such as food. The second approach to curbing fiscal
deficit is by increasing the government’s revenue, which could be achieved through
aggressive taxation methods. (Garuda, 2000)
A few channels come to mind on how such curbing policies could impact the lives
of the poorest economic participants in the society and cause a widening in income
inequality. Even though as highlighted above, government expenditure cuts in health
and education sectors do not seem to have a direct impact of the HDI indicator
(Bradshaw & Huang, 1991), it is highly unlikely that such outlays would not to affect
those who depend on the public sector as a source of income. Such cuts would entail
layoffs, wage ceilings, or in some cases salary reductions. This would automatically
result in a higher unemployment rate, and a general deterioration in income levels of
low-level government employees meanwhile the high-income segments of the society
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that are not dependent on the public sector as source of income would remain
unaffected. Consequences of a higher unemployment and salary cuts would surface as
an increase in poverty while worsening the distribution of income. (Garuda, 2000)
ii.

External Sector Reforms:
The second pillar of structural reforms in IFI programs generally goes down to

changes in the external sector of the economy. Policy alterations in this area refer to
matters related to trade and the exchange rate system, generally speaking aimed at
liberalizing trade as well as making a shift towards a flexible exchange rate structure.
Here IFIs imbed conditions in their programs that urge for the contraction of
restrictions on capital flows and goods. (Forster, Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, &
King, 2019)
In theory devaluation and trade liberalization go hand in hand to improve the
distribution of income and restrain poverty. In a hypothetical scenario that would
ultimately happen as the price ratio of non-tradable to tradable goods is decreased,
devaluation is ought to increase the value of tradable goods in domestic currency. The
problem with this utopian scenario is that it is essentially biased on the assumption that
the poorest segment participants are clustered in rural areas, depending on exporting
farmed goods as a source of income. The fault hence lies in failing to account for the
structure of cluster or composition of the poorest percentile of the populace. Since if
the poor were urban consumers, devaluation and trade liberalization would entail, for
instance, that they have to face higher food prices for instance. Whereas if the rural
farmers were not producing export worthy goods, again they would be faced with high
competition in the domestic market. Therefore ultimately one can argue that reforms in
this sector would only be beneficial to the export dependent segments, while having
detrimental deterioration effects on the rest of the population leading to an unequal
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distribution of income and poverty. Adding to that it is important to note that trade
liberalization reforms leaves local goods facing high competition from international
goods introduced in the market, which may affect employees in the labor force as local
businesses try to stay afloat. (Garuda, 2000)
iii.

Financial Sector Reforms:
The third pillar of conditionality incorporates reforms regarding monetary policy,

which induce the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises and financial
institutions to insure the liberalization of capital flow, while setting targets regarding
the inflation rate. The objectives behind this segment of reforms are to ensure the
stability of the financial sector to shield it from currency predicaments, while at the
same time curbing inflation. (Forster, Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, & King, 2019)
Goals of curbing inflation here are achieved through exercising the necessary
monetary policy to influence market behaviors. In this case in order to combat inflation
central banks raise interest rates, hence inducing a domino effect on other financial
institutions in the domestic market to follow through. Such measures impact the
behavior patterns of consumers; as higher interest rates would increase the value of
accruals on their wealth. Thus investing capital at this point in banks, through treasury
instruments or certificates of deposits, would breed higher returns on money. Hence
the populace would more inclined to invest their capital, rather than spend it on goods
and services, ultimately inducing a deflation process as spending decreases.
The first problem with the financial sector reforms lies in the fact that it benefits
the high-income segment of the populace and discriminates against the low-income
segment hence resulting in the widening of income inequality. Raising interest rates
benefits those who are capable to credit and make an investment opportunity out of
high interest rates, which shapes the high-income segment of economic participants.
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Meanwhile such system would discriminate against the debtor cluster of the populace,
which is mainly constructed out of the low and middle-income segments of economy
participants in developing countries. It is needless to say that such discrimination
would eventually lead to further distortions in income distribution since the high
income segment would make an investment out of higher interest rates building upon
their existent capital, while low-income segments would suffer from higher interest
rates when drawing out loans to finance business needs leaving them with higher debt.
(Forster, Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, & King, 2019)
From another perspective, general inflation reduction ought to improve the real
wages of low-income participants only if wages do not adjust to deflation as quickly as
expenditures. Hence such theory is dependent on this ‘lag’ of adjustment to improve
the value of earnings of the poor, this shapes the second problem of the financial sector
reforms since it can be argued that such reforms produce a non-organic narrowing gap
in income distribution which is only noticeable when this ‘lag’ is present, and
immediately vanishes when if this lag is addressed or when inflation surges once more.
Another faulty aspect of such speculation lies in the assumption that the low-income
cluster do not rely on market economy expenditure; moreover, it also fails to take into
account low-income participants that are not from the farming sector of the economy
such as urban workers. (Garuda, 2000)
The liberalization of capital flows, on the other hand threatens the low-income
segment of the economy. Although the facilitation of portfolio investment as well as
foreign direct investment would induce higher economic growth, hence improving the
formation of human capital. Yet it is important to shed light on the bases of this
hypothetical theory, since the low-income economic participants would not be
clustered at the top of the income distribution chain. Following the cycle of portfolio
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investment, at times of crises as investors exit the market, the most vulnerable segment
to such volatility and amplified financial crisis are the low-income cluster of the
populace. (Forster, Kentikelenis, Reinsberg, Stubbs, & King, 2019)
Although this sector of reforms creates an attractive economic environment for
international investments in local economies, but it also may have detrimental effects
on the lowest segment of economic participants. Especially that portfolio investment
increases the occurring threat of capital flight. It can be argued that financial sector
reforms thus produce a nonorganic image of economic growth in countries in the sense
that such expansion is not dependent on the production of finished export worthy
goods but rather on foreign investments, which at times of crises bring around the
curse of capital flight.
II.

Pre-existent Country Features Debate:
The scholars and politicians that hold an optimist view about IFI programs

claim that their structural adjustment lending programs improve the economic
environment, which stimulates foreign investment as a result of the restoration of
international lenders’ confidence (Garuda, 2000). Such restoration paves the way to an
increase in economic growth, which ought to trickle down to all segments of the
populace (Garuda, 2000). Advocates that share this view allocate the worsening levels
of poverty and income equality to: the different structures of economic environment in
countries in relation to the sociological distribution of its population, as well as the
quality of national institutions. Hence attributing that the IFI lending facilities could
not be held to blame for the deterioration of those two indicators of development,
particularly in the absence of a universal causal mechanism, which identifies the
relationship between structural adjustment programs and income inequality and
poverty. (Oberdabernig, 2013) Pro IFI funding arguments are important to account for
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in this case in order to fairly assess whether elevated poverty levels and distorted
income distribution are an attribution to financial assistance programs or as a result of
pre-existing social conditions of countries.
i.

Functional Distribution:
The first key feature to account for would be the composition of the

sociological concentration of the functional distribution of human capital in the
country. Functional distribution models highlight the sociological density of the
distinctive factors of production strata: capital, land and labour. This feature is of great
importance since it portrays the dynamics of economic environment and consumer
behavior in developing countries. Concentration of low-income income segments,
clustered in rural areas dependent on farming, would imply different economic
consumer behavior patterns than low-income segments clustered in urban areas.
(Marsh, 2016)
Such differences are bound to affect the economic environment of each country
differently, and with it how they are affected by different macroeconomic policies
whether that may be national or international. It is also essential to highlight that
diverse density patterns of the distribution of human capital, may generate different
income distribution patterns. For example Marsh (2016) explains in his study, that
income inequality trends arise as a consequence of the density patters in the functional
distribution. The sectors that reside at the top of the chain – capital- tend to make the
most out of the contemporary capitalist economic environment, he argues that the
income gap between the functional distribution sectors specifically widens when a
sector -especially the capital sector – substitutes another with technology or alternative
replacements. Which is why it’s important to highlight the sector that carries the most

Farag 26
weight in the population strata, in order to have a better understanding of the economic
environment of the country and better explain income inequality patters. (Marsh, 2016)
ii.

Quality of Institutions:
The second key feature that is important to account for would be the quality of

national institutions. Scholars point out that low quality administrations, as well as
corruption, have a direct impact on poverty levels and distortions in the distribution of
income (Hajro & Joyce, 2009). Gupta, Davoodi and Terme (1998) deployed a crosscountry regression study form the period 1980 till 1997, to find that levels of income
inequality seem to surge when corruption levels are high - as portrayed in Figure 1.
Their findings claim that, as the corruption index of a specific country deteriorates by
one standard deviation, the same deterioration surfaces with the same amount in the
Gini coefficient of the same country. An explanation for such occurrence is based on
the theory that corruption hinders the distribution of capital resources into socially
needed sectors.

Figure 1 Gini Index and Inequality
(Gupta, Davoodi, & Terme, 1998, p. p.15)
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2.2 Research Questions & Hypothesis:
Q1, H1:
Question 1: Is the inequality level of countries that are persistently dependent on
International Financial Institutions’ funding a direct consequence of financial
assistance? My hypothesis is that, although pre-existent country features may have an
impact on the levels of inequality exposure a populace faces, the role of funding
assistance sponsored by IFIs will act as a significant catalyst deteriorating the
conditions that are already in place, hence providing the main explanation to the
further widening of income distribution.
Q2, H2:
Question 2: Which of the three structural reform pillars discussed in the conditionality
debate have the most significant impact on inequality? My hypothesis is that
government expenditure reforms and financial sector reforms have the most significant
impact on income distribution, as they are the two pillars that are most likely to
directly impact the poorest segments of the populace.

2.3 Methodology:
I.
i.

Approach:
Gini Index:
One of the most comprehensive economic indicators that can be used to quantify

the degree of inequality is the Gini index, also known as the Gini coefficient. Lars
Osberg (2016) explains that this “index is calculated as the average of the absolute
value of the relative mean difference in incomes between all possible pairs of
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individuals” (Osberg, 2016, p. p:575). A Gini coefficient of 0 means that the citizens in
that particular country have a perfectly equal income, while a Gini coefficient of 100
indicates highest level of income inequality. Developing countries usually have a high
Gini coefficient. In a report that was published by the International Monetary Fund
(2019), it was indicated that high levels of inequality make a country less conducive to
economic growth and development (International Monetary Fund, 2019).
It is important to highlight that a debate exists amongst researches on the actual
effectiveness of utilizing a single index to summarize a comprehensive phenomenon
such as inequality. Critics have argued that indices such as Gini or the Social Welfare
Function are not sufficient nor do they portray an accurate representation of income
distribution patterns within countries. This is mainly on the account that these indices
fail to track the changes occurring within the different classes of the society. A study
by Lars Osberg (2016) shows that countries with the same Gini index portray different
poor versus rich income ratios. Unfortunately since time and recourses are limited for
this project, it will not be possible to obtain an accurate representation of income
inequality patterns using primary resources, hence the Gini index has been chosen for
this role because it’s the most widely available indicator.
ii.

Corruption Preceptions Index:
Hamilton and Hammer (2018, p. 2), identify corruption as the “abuse of public

office for private gain”. In their study they also pinpoint that the most reliable indicator
to measure the level of corruption is the CPI, also known as the Corruption Perceptions
Index. This cross-national indicator is updated on an annual basis through averaging
and accumulating standardized grades of corruption related data. A CPI of 0 means
that the populace in that particular country have to deal with an extremely corrupt
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public sector, while a CPI score of 10 indicates no corruption in the public sector
institutions. (Hamilton & Hammer, 2018)
Although this index was chosen as the most suitable representation of corruption,
it does not necessarily imply that it is the most accurate one. Producing a measurement
of corruption within various divisions of the public sector from a variety of sources can
provide fluctuating results over time. These results hence may represent measurement
error rather than actual changes in corruption scores; this draws the major down side of
utilizing a comprehensive indicator such as the CPI over elongated time periods. On
the other hand, as the most widely available cross-national indicator, it is also the only
one from the basket of indices available that depends on surveys from well-established
institutions, and again although this holds an advantage of portraying reliability of the
index, it also highlights the disadvantage of excluding the inclusion of voter perception
in its scores. (Hamilton & Hammer, 2018)
To test the notion if IFI’s structural adjustment lending programs do in fact have a
direct impact on inequality, a descriptive statistics approach would be adopted on two
stages. The first stage would entail an assessment of the relation between the numbers
of loans received and the Gini coefficient of those countries. The Gini coefficient
would be assessed before, during, and after the loans of dependent countries. States
that undertook structural adjustment loans and experienced economic growth would be
selected, in order to assess the dependent variable, which would be the Gini index.
The second stage would entail that those findings would then be assessed in
relation to the CPI scores of those countries as well as functional distribution of human
capital patterns. By doing so the research would actually test whether structural
adjustments programs sponsored by IFIs do in fact breed inequality, or pre-existent
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country features are to blame for the surging distortions in income distribution and
poverty levels.
The reason why I choose to use corruption as a proxy for institutional inequality
mainly goes back to two main points, first and foremost it has been indicated that
corruption has a direct impact on income inequality since it plays a great role in the
misallocation of resources of public office for private gain as explained by Hamilton
and Hammer (2018, p. 2). The second reason why this specific indicator was selected
for the purpose of this research is attributed to the fact that international financial
groups tend to keep tabs on the corruption levels of the countries they are planning to
invest in, since it’s considered as a key indicator when taking into consideration market
risk calculations.
II.

Case Studies:
For the purpose of this research, three countries were chosen as case studies from

the lists included in relevant research papers in this field. To control for economic
capabilities in the selection process, states that are considered as emerging markets
were chosen. From those short-listed I separated the countries into different groups
depending on revenues of different economic sectors as a percentage of GDP. Within
those categories I then looked for countries that had comparable population numbers
and unemployment rates. The result of this elimination method brought up the
selection of the following countries mentioned in Table 5, which are going to be
compatible with a comparison approach.
Apart from ensuring that the selected case studies can be compared objectively, it
was crucial to choose states that undertook different number of loans in order to test
for the causality with the Gini Index. I followed Oberdabernig’s (2013) observation of
the Gini coefficient by using the same data set she utilized in her research (UNU-
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WIDER, 2020) since it represents a more comprehensive version than that represented
in Garuda’s (2000) study (Deininger & Squire, 2013).
Table 5 *Figures in this table are extracted from: (UNU-WIDER, 2020) (International Monetary Fund,
2020) (Central Bank of Egypt, 2018) (The World Bank, 2020). This table presents the figures that lead
to the section of those specific countries as case studies.

Country

Tourism as a %
of GDP

Unemployment
Rate
(1985)
8.7%

#. Of
Arrangements

Gini
Index

2.14% as of 2018

Population
(Mn)
(1985)
31.012

Colombia

26

Egypt

3.9% as of 2018

45.217

8%

10

Turkey

3.82% as of 2018

47.073

6.9%

19

(1982)
56
(1981)
37
(1983)
45

It is important to note that each country from the selected case studies will be
studied independently according to the time frame each country started to implement
the neo-liberal policy reforms after the IMF shifted its policy agenda to the structural
adjustment programs. The end of the studied period for each case study will hence be
mainly and mostly determined by the latest published Gini scores, and the biases upon
which the time frames have been selected for each case study is extensively explained
in the introduction sections of each chapter respectively.
III. Limitations:
As discussed above to measure the effect of the exogenous variable on income
distribution, the Gini and the CPI indices have been selected to be the focal point for
this research. Unfortunately this shapes one of the limitations in this thesis project
since both indicators do not tend to portray the most accurate representation of such
comprehensive country qualities. Since time and resources are limited, the use of
primary materials to measure the dependent variables more accurately will not be
possible, and because of availability reasons these indicators have been selected to
represent the tends of income inequality and corruption.
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Another limitation of this research will be the observation of the indicators
measuring the endogenous variables. Since the scope is mainly targeting emerging
markets economies, countries segmented in these strata have inconsistent updates on
their indicators. For example for the Gini index, I noticed that Egypt’s releases are
once every five years and not on an annual basis. To overcome such limitation the
number of observations will either have to be decreased for the same indicator
representing the other two countries. Or an interpolation mechanism will be adopted to
average out the figures for Colombia and Turkey condensing it to a once every fiveyear release.
As for the CPI index it has also come to my attention that the indicator was
revolutionized after 2011 to reflect a new score system, since the index dataset did not
include the methodological formula on how this new scoring system worked it made it
difficult to take into consideration scores published after 2011 for the purpose of this
research. Although other sophisticated indices were available for use to measure for
institutional inequality on a micro level yet the focus of this research remains to look at
corruption on a macro level which more complex indices were not sufficient in
meeting this requirement as they were more specific to different types of corruption.
It is also important to highlight that for time and resources limitation reasons, this
research will depend on the work of previous studies in order to contribute to the
existent knowledge regarding the reviewed subject. Which is why the materials used
hereafter have been computed by fellow scholars in the field and are not primary
materials. The purpose of this research is to build upon what is already there, aiming to
use this knowledge to figure out if a pattern does indeed exist. Yet further research will
be eventually required to further investigate the findings of this paper.
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Chapter 3: The Colombian Case Study
3.1 Introduction:
There are four main types of arrangements that the IMF offers to developing
countries to pave the way to economic growth while cushioning economic fallout
blows, these arrangements include but are not limited to: the stand by arrangement, the
extended fund facility, the structural adjustment facility, and the enhanced structural
adjustment facility. All of which share fundamentally the same goals to liberalize trade
and enforce flexible exchange rate systems, decreasing or eliminating the distortions in
the balance of payments, and induce monetary policy conditions aimed at curbing
inflation. They do differ, however, in their size and duration, and it is needless to point
out that, the more substantial is the funding provided by a program, the harsher and
more rigid its conditions are. Also, to insure proper implementation and compliance
with conditionality, the Fund disburses tranches of the long term loans after certain
goals have been achieved after period of time. (Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000)
Colombia opted to seek twenty-six loans during its membership in the
International Monetary fund, 65.4% of which were Stand By Arrangements, 30.8%
were Flexible Credit Lines, and 3.8% were Extended Fund Facilities, receiving
approximately a total of $76.6 billion to date (Figure 2). Upon analysis of the
Colombian financial position in the Fund, it became apparent that the country was
under short-term financial funding (SBAs) for fifteen consecutive years, from 1957 to
1974, with a grace period of 25 years before opting for a medium-term arrangement in
1999 (EFF) that lasted for 3 years. (International Monetary Fund, 2021)
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Figure 2:
The Breakdown of the Colombian Position with the Fund to Date:
(International Monetary Fund, 2021)

EFF, 3.80%

FCLs, 30.80%
SBAs, 65.40%

This observation led to the decision to limit the time frame of this case study to
begin during the 1970s until 2002 after the completion of the EFF. As discussed in the
introduction of this thesis, the 1970s mark the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
international economic system; yet it wasn’t until the 1982 debt crisis that the IMF
began imbedding conditions in their structural adjustment programs. This will give this
research a great opportunity to compare the effects of IFI funding on three different
levels. Firstly, it will explore the effects of international lending facilities without
conditionality on inequality, which would mark the period from 1970-1974. The
second approach will be to compare this period with a similar period of time when
Colombia was under another facility which included conditionality – in this case, the
EFF period from 1999-2002. The final step is to compare the average Gini index of
those two periods with the grace period that marks the span between the two spells.
This would hence ensure that this research employs a critical analytical approach
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towards uncovering whether IFI funding has a direct role in increasing or decreasing
inequality, the results then would then be compared with the CPI of those time periods
to provide the findings for the first research question.
Table 6 (International Monetary Fund, 2021)

Facility
EFF
SBA
SBA
SBA
SBA

Starting
20-Dec-1999
6-Jun-1973
1-May-1972
21-Apr-1971
21-Apr-1970

Ending
19-Dec-2002
5-Jun-1974
30-Apr-1973
20-Apr-1972
20-Apr-1971

Amount (USD)
2,795,023,515.62
28,564,369.09
57,128,738.18
54,272,301.27
54,986,410.50

The first type of lending program, which is present during the time frame
chosen for this study, as portrayed in Table 6, is the Stand By Arrangement. The SBA
is considered as a short-term lending program, which lasts typically for one year but
could be extended for an additional twelve months. This type of program is considered
a non-concessional lending facility, which means that countries on the receiving end
pay interest when settling this loan. (International Monetary Fund, 2021) The size of
the loan is also relatively smaller when compared with the Extended Fund Facility
which is considered as a medium term lending program typically lasting three years
but may be extended to a fourth year. The EFF is mainly designed for countries facing
medium terms balance of payments disequilibria caused by deep structural weakness
hence requiring a lengthy time frame to address the root cause of this problem.
Beneficiaries that seek out this facility are expected to comply with the structural
reforms, which are mainly focused to address economic weaknesses, and because this
lending program is larger in its financial size as well as period of time when compared
with the SBA, the conditions embedded within the EFF tend require rigorous reforms,
which are monitored to allocate the full size of the loan over tranches as goals are
achieved. (International Monetary Fund, 2021)
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Before discussing how both the SBAs and the EFF structural reform
conditionality may have induced an increase in income inequality, it is important to
shed light on the functional distribution of the labor force in the country in order to
better understand how the structural reforms may impact the populace, as previously
discussed in the conceptual framework section. According to Attanasio, Goldberg, &
Pavcnik in their study (2004), eighty-five percent of the Colombian workforce are
clustered in the urban sector. It is also of importance to note that Colombia is a major
exporter of coffee and it has been evident that changes exchange rates of the
Colombian peso fluctuates heavily depending on its export rates of raw materials
coffee being largest sector of them. (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004)

Since the SBA’s during the study period were prior to the IMF’s agenda shift
that took place after 1982, it was not surprising that publications on their web page did
not include the terms of agreements that those SBA’s were granted upon. This could
mean one of two things, firstly is that the fund did not employ a transparency policy
with the public on the terms it would grant or reject loans as implied by Easterly
(2005) when he was questioning the basis on which the IMF grants loans if recipient
countries fail to comply repetitively with conditionality, this then later changed after
mass criticism from scholars in previous research. The second explanation would be
that loans given out at the time were granted based on eligibility rather than eligibility
as well as the agreement comply with the structural reform conditions as implied by
Dreher (2006) where he suggests that the IMF tends to grant loans undemocratic
governments more often than they do to democratic governments since they believed
that less democratic governments could use their authoritative power to enforce the
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conditions without having to answer to public opinion, a feature an elected democratic
political regime lacked. (Dreher, 2006)
As for the Extended Fund Facility, two documents were published on the IMF
webpage that included the terms conditionality that the EFF was granted upon. The
first one was the letter of intent, which was sent to the managing director of the fund,
and it basically lists the economic policies that the Colombian government is willing to
structurally reform in order to qualify for the lending facility. According to this letter
the Colombian government was willing to implement fiscal macroeconomic policies
for the medium term to curb the fiscal deficit, the Colombian government intended to
do so mainly by implementing major structural reforms in the public sector by
liquidating and disinvesting in public banks as well as strengthening tax enforcement
by eliminating exempted sources of income and increasing income tax. (Government
of Colombia, 1999)
The second set of policies that the Colombian government intended to
implement were the monetary and exchange rates policies, which were mainly aimed
at curbing inflation and implementing a flexible exchange rate system, which would
increase the sources of foreign currency resources hence boost the country’s foreign
currency reserves, this target would only be achieved through the liberalization of
capital flows which in turn will increase the foreign direct investment activities.
(Government of Colombia, 1999)
The third and final set of policies discussed in this letter of intent was the
external sector policies, which mainly revolved around the commitment of the
government to implement a liberal trade regime and to comply with the World Trade
Organization’s principles, to lower tariffs on agricultural sector imports. (Government
of Colombia, 1999)
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The second document was the minutes of the press release conference that the
IMF held to publically announce granting the Colombian government the extended
funding facility. In the minutes of this release the IMF discusses the points of structural
reforms that that Colombian government have to undergo as part of this arrangement.
The similarity between the letter of intent and the press release confirm the policy
reform areas discussed above and the upcoming section will discuss how such reforms
may have had a theoretical impact on inequality. (IMF External Relations Department,
1999)

3.2 Theoretical Implications of the Three Pillars of Conditionality in Colombia:
I.

Public sector reforms:
As discussed, reforms in this sector mainly revolve around curbing the

expenditure of the government in order to decrease the fiscal deficit. For the
Colombian case, such reforms took shape mainly in the form of increasing taxation and
liquidating public banks. By disinvesting in public banks the government would have
started inducing the proves of privatization of the public sector hence reliving the
procurement of further debt, hence cutting down on expenses. In the meantime,
implementing aggressive taxation regimes would increase revenues to decrease the
fiscal deficit as well as provide resources for pension plans and health and education
spending.
Although this plan seems theoretically sound, but research shows that a 10%
increase in payroll taxes downgrades wages by approximately 1.4% -2.3%, it also
negatively effects employment behavior by approximately 4% to 5% (Kugler &
Kugler, 2009). These findings show how such policy reforms would negatively impact
the Colombian populace in general, Kugler & Kugler (2009) go on to identify that the
unskilled labour segment are the particular segment of the labour force that is severely
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impacted by such policy reforms when compared to the skilled labour segment of the
Colombian work force, and this is mainly due to the fact that this poorer fragment of
the workforce reacts to the increasing payroll taxation by turning to the informal
economic sector to seek better paychecks that are not taxable in order to secure better
net income levels. (Kugler & Kugler, 2009)
The letter of intent and the press release held by the IMF in 1999 both assured
that, although the stated aim of these reforms was to curb public spending to decrease
the fiscal deficit, health and education spending would not be affected. (Government of
Colombia, 1999) (IMF External Relations Department, 1999) Indeed this statement
could be confirmed as research shows that with the increase in payroll taxes came
increasing health care benefits (Kugler & Kugler, 2009). It is crucial to highlight a
turning point for this finding, which was arguably the key behind the causes of
inequality that this section of reforms bred. The fragment of the Colombian workforce
who would benefit from the increases of healthcare benefits remain to mostly be the
skilled labor segment, which was the same segment which is less severely impacted by
the increase of payroll taxation and also the same segment which doesn’t turn to the
informal sector of the economy. Compared with the unskilled labor fragment, it is
immediately evident how such conditions paved the way to both income and social
inequality since the wage downgrade forced most of them to turn to the informal sector
of the economy to evade taxation, hence loosing sustainable employment to face
worsening working conditions and no healthcare benefits.
II.

External Sector Reforms:
External sector reforms revolve around the concept of trade liberalization, a

process that takes place by reducing or eliminating trade tariffs aimed at protecting
local businesses and produced goods, by doing so the Colombian economy becomes
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integrated in the international market. According to a study by Attanasio, Goldberg, &
Pavcnik (2004), looking into the effects of trade reforms on wage inequality; the
Colombian trade policy underwent major fluctuation from liberalized trading policies
in the 1970s to trade protectionism measures during the early 1980s in attempt to
reverse the impact of increased foreign competition as well as the exchange rate surge
that the Colombian economy experienced as a reaction to the liberalized trade policies.
(Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004)
The timeline outlined in Attanasio et al’s research appears to be consistent with
the patterns of lending that Colombia underwent during 1970-2002 (mentioned in
Table 1), during which the country experienced trade liberalization reforms under the
consecutive SBA spells, and reversed them during the early 1980s which marks the
grace period of Colombia’s lending activities, before gradually liberalizing its trade
regimen by decreasing tariff concentrations and almost removing the non-tariff barriers
to trade in the late 1990, as a preparation procedure prior to receiving the extended
funding facility from the IMF in 1999 (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004).
Attanasio et al’s research findings show that during the periods when Colombia
witnessed an increase in economic reforms mainly related to trade liberalization
measures that managerial level candidates were in high demand, which was reflected
in the managerial perimum that the labour force witnessed during those times. One
could therefore argue that such policy reforms immidately induced inequality by
creating a sense of financial exclusion, where the top managerial sectors experienced
the gains of trade libralization translated into higher wages, while other segments of
the labour force (such as production labour and unskilled labour) experienced major
wage cuts as companies try to economize their expenses to be able to compete with the
increased foreign competition. (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004)

Results
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portrayed in Table 7 obtained from Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik’s (2004), and
specifcally those in columes 1-3 show that sectors that experince and increase in tarrif
reductions, saw a subsequent increase in “rapid skill-based technological change, as
measured by the proportion of skilled workers.” (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik,
2004, p. 350) Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik’s (2004), explain that colums 4-6 in
Table 7 confirms the ‘defensice innovation’ theory which indicates that local
businesses that operate in sectors that experince high tarrif cuts that inturn increase
“import competetion look for new methods of production that economize on unskilled
labour.” (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004, p. 350)
Table 7: (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004, p. 349)

It was also evident that inequality was becoming widespread during the late
1990s phase, where protection measures were systamatically eased off. The study by
Attanasio et al shows that a 50% tariff reduction was correlated with a 6% decrease in
wages in that same sector, they highlight that the manufacturing sector held most of the
trade liberalization policy reforms, to be particular this sector included “textiles and
apparel, food processing, and wood and wood processing”. (Attanasio, Goldberg, &
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Pavcnik, 2004, p. 356). When compared with sectors that did not experince tariff
reductions, results show that protection was transalted to an increase in the average
wage in that segment. On the other hand inequality was not only increasing within
sectors but also amongst sectors especially that the sectors which experinced the
largest tarrif cuts were infact the sectors with the highst shares of unskilled labour as
portrayed in Fig 3, which showes that the sectors that experienced the highest tarrid
reductions were the sectors that included the highest share of blue collar workers.
Figure 3: (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004) “Tariff reductions and share of unskilled workers.”

Hence one could conclude that the trade reform policies implemented under IFI
funding induced changes in the wage perimums which led to an increase of inequality,
remarkably that since those reforms began the colombian workforce saw a drastic
increase in it’s informal sector employees which reached 60%. This inturn
complements the observation that intensified forigen competetion coerces local
businesses to become more competitive and downgrade cots by subcontracting
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employees from the informal sector of the economy or by laying off staff that inturn
seek jobs in the formal sector. (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik, 2004)
III.

Financial Sector Reforms:
Structural reforms in this pillar essentially target reforms in the financial sector,

such as the implementation of a monetary policy strategy to aid in curbing inflation
through stimulating higher interest rates which would pave the way for the
liberalization of capital flows to start attracting foreign direct investment. As discussed
in the conceptual framework chapter, inequality as a result of this pillar of
conditionality could be induced as a result of financial exclusion of the poorest
segment of the economy or during capital flight crises, which occur as foreign
investors exist the market during economic crises.
According to the existing research, one of the main reasons behind inequality
caused by financial sector reforms goes back to a poorly functioning capital markets
system that favors the top portion of the employment chain and excludes opportunities
to the poorest segments of the populace. This is particularly the case in Colombia since
the concentration in the higher percentile of the labor force reflects a higher education
degree, which most of the labor force lack. (Velde, 2003)
Unlike the previous pillars of conditionality, reforms in this sector became
evident prior to receiving the extended funding facility from the IMF, which was
reflected in the Colombian foreign direct investment accumulative flows as a
percentage of GDP (as portrayed in figure 4), which started to increase around 1997 to
prepare the economy for embracing the reforms of the EFF. Table 8 portrays that the
majority of accumulative flows of FDIs in Colombia were clustered in the “services
and others” sector, specifically in the financial sector and electrical of the country.
(Velde, 2003)
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Figure 4: (Velde, 2003)

Table 8: Sector Distribution of FDIs in Latin America (Velde, 2003)

The study by Velde (2003) examines the effects of FDI on income inequality to
find that FDIs are negatively correlated with inequality, predominantly amongst
employees with second and third levels of education as compared with first and second
levels of education. (Velde, 2003) Those findings are consistent with the findings of
the trade liberalization reforms, which have proven to favor the top percentile of the
skilled labor work force; they also confirm the theoretical approach of the detriments
of foreign direct investment on income inequality, since the results highlight that the
skilled segment and educated workers are the ones that have most to gain from FDIs in
comparison to unskilled labor in terms of wage increases. The reasons behind these
phenomena lies in the fact that foreign direct investment tends to induce skill specific
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technological advances, which could be associated with skill specific wage bargaining
power hence the perpetuating inequality levels. (Velde, 2003)

3.3 Findings:
I.

Gini Index Scores:
Table 9 portrays the results of the Gini observation conducted for this research,

which shows that the averaged Gini index over time periods when Colombia was under
lending facility arrangements was higher by 0.47%-1.23% compared to the grace
period which witnessed the lowest recording to the Gini index during the study period
of the Colombian case study. The main reason why the Gini index was averaged was
mainly to ensure that all input scores (Income gross/Income net) from different area
covers (urban/rural) were taken into consideration when analyzing the index to avoid
out liars, and minimize computing errors.
Table 9 (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Time frame

Gini Average

EFF 1999-2002

51.87

Grace Period 1975-1998

50.64

SBAs 1970-1974

51.11

As explained in the introduction a higher score of the Gini coefficient indicates
a higher level of income inequality, and quantitative results in Table 9 support the
theoretical approach discussed in the previous section. One can note that Colombia
recorded a score of 51.87 during the extended funding facility that started in 1999. This
period also marks the time frame when the country experienced the highest number of
deep and harsh structural reforms to qualify and receive the medium term lending
facility. When comparing the Gini score during the EFF with the grace period you see
a significant change of 1.23%, which indicates that structural adjustment lending
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facilities provided by IFI does have a direct impact on the increasing levels of
inequality in the Colombian case.
What was remarkable though was coming across the realization that the more
structural adjustment conditions the loans enforced the higher the Gini index score
was. This is evident when one compares the coefficient scores of the SBA spells and
the EFF time period, results show that short term lending facilities with less conditions
imbedded within them perpetuate lower inequality effects on the Colombian populace.
II.

CPI Scores:
The corruption perception index was established in 1995, Table 10 presents the

CPI scores of Colombia since the establishment of this index up to 2002, hence
representing 4 years during the grace period prior to the EFF, which was active since
1999 up till 2002.
Table 10 (Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption)

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

CPI Score
3.44
2.73
2.23
2.20
2.90
3.20
3.80
3.60

The purpose of utilizing the CPI index in my study was to test whether preexisting country features are the main perpetuating forces behind inequality in the
chosen case studies. Scores in the index range from 0-10, with zero indicating the
highest levels of corruption and 10 indicating no corruption in the public sector. As
shown in Table 10, during the EFF Colombia experienced a gradual decrease in its
corruption levels when compared to the grace period, which recorded lower CPI scores
indicating higher levels of corruption in the public sector.
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It is of importance to note that corruption levels are one of the indicators that
foreign investors monitor amongst a basket of indices before taking the decision to
invest in an emerging market, such as Colombia. This explains the higher FDI
accumulative flows as a percentage of GDP that the country experienced during the
extended funding facility provided by the international monetary fund. (Velde, 2003)
Yet when it comes to comparing the CPI scores with the Gini index scores if
pre-existent country features were indeed amongst the main perpetuating mechanism
behind the increasing levels of inequality in Colombia, we should expect to see a
negative correlation between the two scores. I.e. as the Gini index records high levels
of inequality, the CPI would record low scores to reflect high levels of corruption and
vise-versa.

Table 11 (Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption)

Time frame

Averaged CPI Score

Grace Period Average

2.65

EFF Period Average

3.38

In reality the CPI scores portray a positive correlation between the two indices as
portrayed in Table 11, when I averaged the CPI score for Colombia during the grace
period it computed a score of 2.65, which reflects 27.5% higher levels of corruption
when compared with the average CPI score computed during the extended funding
facility. Those results suggests that since the grace period marks higher levels of
corruption yet lower levels of inequality, which suggests that the CPI does not have a
direct impact on inequality in the Colombian case. Yet it is important to note that the
observations conducted in this research are primitive in nature and require further
studies based on primary resources in order to better analyze the situation.
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3.4 Conclusion:
The findings of the Colombian case study suggest that IFI funding has a direct role
in increasing inequality within the labor force. Although the levels of inequality are
relatively high in Colombia through out the study period of this case study, those levels
seem to increase when the country is under the spells of lending facilities. The increase
becomes even more evident when the funding facility is medium termed, suggesting
that the conditionality within the loans tends to have a negative impact on inequality.
This in turn would confirm hypothesis number one for the Colombian case, yet the
findings for Turkey and Egypt are still needed before concluding on the matter.
Findings of Attanasio et al’s study shows that although fucntional distribution
might have a slight effect on inequality depending on the cluster of the labour force of
the country and their level of education, yet since their reseach eliminated those
variables by looking at inequality within workgroups, they still found that there was an
increase in the income gap between same work groups during the times the Colomian
government seeked international financial assistance. (Attanasio, Goldberg, & Pavcnik,
2004) This revelation also stands in support of the first hypothesis that the role of IFI
fundings act as a catalyst deteriorating the condtions that are already in place, and the
results from the CPI scores mentioned above also confirm that this is the case for both
prexistent country features in the colombian case.
As for hypothesis number two which addresses which of the three pillars of
conditionality has the most significant impact on inequality, the Colombian case shows
that most prominent pillars that carry most of the weight behind the rising levels of
inequality are the imposed government expenditure reforms, and more specifically the
external sector reforms. This refutes the second part of hypothesis number two, since I
expected that the financial sector reforms would substitute the external sector reforms.
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The main reason behind the weight of the external sector reforms for the Colombian
case goes back to the fact the economic nature of the country is mainly based on
exporting raw materials such as coffee, wood and semi-finished goods such as textiles.
An economy heavily based on those exports would hence be mainly negatively
impacted by international foreign competition, rather than FDI’s and the liberalization
of capital flows.
As for the government expenditure section, as hypothesized curbing public
spending showed to have a direct role in increasing the levels of inequality. This was
particularly expected in the Colombian case especially under the EFF, where the
government was obligated to disinvest and liquidate many of its large public sector
banks. Such instances were bound to increase the probability of wage cuts for low
segment employees in this sector in particular, when paired with the high payroll
taxation methods it was only normal that we observe a winding gap in the distribution
of income.
After analyzing the Colombian case, I believe that government expenditure will
be one of the recurring pillars that has a significant weight in relation to inequality
when compared with the other two pillars, this is mainly because curbing public
spending is bound to effect the wages and living conditions of the poorest segments of
the work force of any country. Meanwhile the weight of significance of the other two
pillars seem to be country specific depending on the nature of economic dynamics in
that country.
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Chapter 4: The Egyptian Case Study
4.1 Introduction:
Upon inspection of the Egyptian financial position with the International
Monetary Fund, we immediately see similarities and differences with the Colombian
position in the Fund. Similarities include the type of funding facilities both countries
went under, yet the main difference mainly resides in the number of funding programs
both countries sought out, hence the time frame for each case study it not the same
since each country started seeking IFI funding at different points which mainly
depended on the country’s economic needs.
Egypt first began to seek IFI funding in the early 1960s, and has received a
total of 11 facilities with a sum of approximately 23.3 billion USD from the IMF to
date. Like Colombia the majority of the facilities Egypt received were Stand by
Arrangements making up 64% of the total facilities received, 27% belonged to the
Extended Funding Facility and only 9% were Rapid Financing Instruments (Figure 5).
Egyptian Position with the Fund
RFI
9%
EFF
27%
SBA
64%

SBA
Figure 5 (International Monetary Fund, 2021)

EFF

RFI
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On the other hand, unlike the Colombian case, periods of consecutive funding
were not as extensive for Egypt. On the contrary, as portrayed below in Table 12
consecutive spells occurred the first time in 1962-1965 that included two SBAs. This
was followed by a 12-year grace period before the second consecutive funding wave,
which was in 1977-1981 when Egypt sought out a Standby Arrangement followed by
an Extended Funding Facility. The third wave of consecutive funding began in 1991,
beginning with Standby Arrangement tailed by an Extended Funding facility in 1993,
which was followed by another Standby Arrangement that ended in 1998. The fourth
and final wave began recently in 2020 through the Rapid Financing Instrument to help
Egypt with the economic fallout caused by Covid-19 followed by the Standby
Arrangement, which ended on 25 June 2021. (International Monetary Fund, 2021)
Table 12 Egypt’s position with the Fund (International Monetary Fund, 2021)

Facility
Standby Arrangement
Rapid Financing Instrument
Extended Fund Facility
Standby Arrangement
Extended Fund Facility
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Extended Fund Facility
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement

Start Date
26-Jun-2020
11-May-2020
11-Nov-2016
11-Oct-1996
20-Sep-1993
17-May-1991
15-May-1987
28-Jul-1978
20-Apr-1977
23-May-1964
7-May-1962

End Date
25-Jun-2021
13-May-2020
29-Jul-2019
30-Sep-1998
19-Sep-1996
31-May-1993
30-Nov-1988
27-Jul-1981
19-Apr-1978
22-May-1965
6-May-1963

Amount in USD
5,371,372,300
2,907,297,859
12,268,808,380
387,335,251
570,869,934
334,529,782
356,793,709
856,304,902
178,396,855
57,086,993
60,654,931

For the sake of this research, in order to inspect the effects of the conditionality
imbedded in the Funding facilities on inequality, it is important to study the
consecutive periods of spells and have them compared with grace periods in order to
critically analyze whether the exogenous variable has a direct impact on the
endogenous variable. For the Egyptian case the period studied will being in 1977 and
end in 2015; this time frame was chosen to incorporate two consecutive waves of
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funding facilities as well as grace periods, although it will be excluding the other two
waves of IFI loans but it is not without reasoning that this time structure was chosen.
On a domestic level, the period before 1970 marks Egypt’s socialist era, which was led
by president Gamal Abd el-Nasser (Skousen, 2012); on an international level during
this time the IMF was not yet reformed to begin imbedding conditionality within its
funding facilities, hence this phase will be excluded.
The 1970s, on the other hand, saw the political and economic reforms led by
president Anwar el-Sadat, which directed Egypt away from the previous socialist
regime, paving the way to the ‘Infitah’ economic policy after the Ramadan war that
took place in 1973. The Infitah economic policy was introduced to open the door for
foreign and domestic investment in the private sector to curb the dominance and
monopoly of the public sector investments in the Egyptian economy. This was also
perceived as the breaking point for the Egyptian-Russian alliance that was later
replaced with the American alliance during the 1977 peace talks with Israel. Since then
Egypt has been and still is undergoing various structural reforms that are mainly
induced by the IFI funding conditionality, but since the Gini Index data set this study
will be using only dates till 2015 the time frame has been set from 1977-2015 to mark
the period from which the first loan Egypt sought with imbedded conditionally till the
end of the last funding facility that that the Gini Index data set includes.
According to the press release issued by the IMF’s external relations
department on their website in 1996, the main channels of structural reforms on the
Fund’s agenda for Egypt during its medium term funding facility which lasted from
1996-1998 and included the deepening and expansion of the privatization process
accompanied by trade liberalization policies as well as financial/fiscal sector reforms:
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“ (1) Further liberalization of Egypt's international trade system, including
further tariff reductions and elimination of quantitative restrictions; (2) fiscal
revenue reforms, including the transformation of the general sales tax into a
value-added tax (VAT); the rationalization of the income tax to make it simpler,
broader based, and more transparent and equitable; (3) a well-articulated
medium-term program for improving the civil service; and (4) an acceleration of
financial sector reform, including privatization of banks and insurance
companies, and a further strengthening of banking supervision.” (International
Monetary Fund, 1996)

The structural reforms listed above in the press release are classified within the
main pillars of conditionality, which will be discussed specifically in the Egyptian case
in the upcoming section of the chapter before proceeding to the analysis section prior
to the conclusion of the chapter. It is of importance to highlight that point one refers to
the external sector reforms section, were as points two and three listed above refer to
methods of fiscal consolidation which go under the public reforms section which
mainly entails increasing the public sector’s revenue through curbing public
expenditure and reforming the taxation system, while point four addresses the financial
sector reforms to attract FDIs.

4.2 Theoretical Implications of the Three Pillars of Conditionality in Egypt:
I.

Public sector reforms:
During the Egyptian ‘socialist era’ (Skousen, 2012) and early 1970s, the

Egyptian population experienced a solid coherent social contract. Under which the
public sector provided several arrangements of social welfare, including subsidized
utility and foods, free education and health care, as well as guaranteed employment
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opportunities in an over stretched public sector. According to Torayeh (2015), the
fiscal deficit during this time period was principally propelled by a staggering surge in
the subsidy bills, public wages bill, and debts service costs, all of which makeup
roughly 75% of public expenditures as portrayed in Table 13. In fact, according to her
study, fiscal deficits are not purely implications of an increased public expenditure
behavior but also occur as a result of low public revenues, generated through taxation,
which in the case of Egypt are far below the swelling of public expenditure by about
7%. (Torayeh, 2015)
Table 13: The Breakdown of Egypt’s Public Spending (Torayeh, 2015)

The structural adjustment programs induced by the IMF in the late 1970s and
early 1980s paved the way to the erosion of this social contract with a cutback of state
activity in social services sectors, which as discussed above is one of the main pillars
of the structural adjustment conditions of IMF funding is curbing public expenditure.
This ultimately resulted in the increase of poverty and decrease in social welfare
especially for the middle and low-income segment of the society who tend to depend
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more on such welfare programs for an improved standard of living and income. The
degradation of living standards started to surface in the Egyptian society despite the
macro economic improvement that Egypt witnessed during this period of time, which
was unfortunately more felt and materialized mostly by the high-income segment of
the society. (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014)
Although public spending on health care and education, faced the least
cutbacks yet research shows that the low income segment on the society and mostly the
residents of the slums have been faced difficulties in accessing the simplest
government services, including electricity services, access to hospitals or schools, let
alone the slightest provision of water and sewage. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021) Another
section of government expenditure that Egypt was keen on protecting during the IFI
lending facilities was the subsidies, although according El-Said & Harrigan (2014) the
IMF insisted on reforming the whole subsidy system during and through its lending
facilities, since it weighs heavily on the budget particularly in periods of surges in the
global prices of food especially that Egypt is a net importer of wheat and other food
items. (Torayeh, 2015) Yet the Egyptian government was resilient in rebelling to
comply with this particular section of reforms during negotiations with the Fund, as it
was feared that such policy reform would induce social and political unrest within the
country given that the majority of the population depends on the food and utilities
subsidy program. (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014)
The public sector employed 80% of the Egyptian skilled labor force, during the
second and mainly the third wave of consecutive funding programs issued by the IMF
to Egypt, the country has witnessed an increased privatization activity in the public
sector. (Hendy & Zaki, 2012) That being said, we can immediately see the channels
that breed an unequal distribution of opportunity and income between different
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segments of the society since the privatization of state owned companies and banks
have had a negative impact on the employment patterns of those sectors especially
since the private sector wasn’t able to keep up with the increased number of job
seekers by creating new job opportunities, this was mainly due to the hardships that the
local SMEs faced during the establishment of their business. Small and Medium
Enterprises tend to have higher labor intensity in Egypt when compared to Larger local
businesses, yet they were unable to provide formal job opportunities to absorb the
unemployment caused by public sector layoffs as a consequence of the difficulties they
faced to obtain the needed license and permits for their startups. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021)
While the high and middle ranking government officials were financially secured in
their jobs the low ranking government employees were not only victims of wage
ceilings to decrease public wage bills but also layoffs, such patterns lead to a surge in
the unemployment rate and ultimately to the increase of income disparities across
ranks and sectors.
Another aspect of the fiscal consolidation plan is increasing the public revenue
to aid in the process of decreasing government expenditure. Revenues in the public
sector are mainly sourced from taxes, according to the IMF press release (1996) Egypt
was to reform its taxing system through implementing a broader income taxation
which was ought to be more rationalized and simpler in order to avoid unequal taxation
methods cross the different sectors of the labor force. However in reality when this
system was indeed implemented research shows that Egypt was left with a heavy
regressive taxation system since the rich percentile of the Egyptian population along
with the large domestic firms were found to have improved admittance to tax
incentives and opportunities when compared to their counterparts, such as SMEs which
are faced with unsupportive regressive taxation system as well as poor access to the
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finance system which ended up producing a sense of informality in the Egyptian
economy that further lead to disparities in income equality. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021)
II. External Sector Reforms:
The 1980’s brought about increased economic reform regarding the
liberalization of trade practices to set the Egyptian economy on the transitioning
trajectory towards market-oriented policies. (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014) In Egypt the
external sector reforms induced by IFI funding facilities have been characterized
mainly by an accelerated rate of structural adjustment reforms aimed at reducing and
removing tariffs imposed on imported goods and services, in the country to fix the
macro imbalances in the Egyptian economy. Hendy & Zaki (2012) highlight that tariffs
on imports have decreased from 110% during the 1980s to reach levels as low as 40%
during the 1990s.

Although free trade is ought to create a more competitive

environment and hence induce a an efficient non-discriminatory economic cycle, yet it
has been proven that such reforms have had adverse effects on real wages of the labour
workforce in Egypt since the reduction of tariffs has had a significant impact on
production, which had a spill over effect to impact exports and hence imports and with
it the employment rate of the effected sectors. (Hendy & Zaki, 2012)
The study by Hendy & Zaki (2012) found that in Egypt’s case since the kick
off the trade liberalization reforms that real wages in the exporting sectors have
increased while wages in the importing sectors have witnessed a decline in their wages
as a result of the deterioration in the importing sector’s revenues. They go on to
explain that the root cause of the regression in wages in the importing sector goes
mainly back to the idea of increased competition in the local market which forces local
firms to decrease their costs in terms of shrinking the wages of low-skilled workers.
On the other hand given the high demand for skilled workers especially in exporting
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sectors of the Egyptian economy Hendy & Zaki (2012) found that the increase in
demand boosted the average income of this sector of the work force. That being said,
it is clear from the results they have portrayed in their study, which are shown below in
Table 14, how the external reforms induced by IFI lending facilities stimulated a
trajectory course leading to inequality within the Egyptian work force. (Hendy &
Zaki, 2012)
They have also identified that in Egypt 65% of the functional distribution of the
labor force is clustered in the urban area of greater Cairo, hence highlighting that not
only do the merits of the trade liberalization reforms fail to materialize across sectors
as discussed above but also across geographical regions within Egypt, since their
results portray that there is an evident gap in wages between sectorial levels in rural
areas when compared to urban areas of the country. (Hendy & Zaki, 2012)
Table 14: Labor Wages in Egypt Functional Distribution and Sectorial level (Hendy & Zaki, 2012)

It is important to highlight that the only sectors that experience the merits of the
external sector reforms are the sectors that Egypt has a comparative advantage in when
it comes to exports. These segments include the textiles and cloths segments as well as
the chemicals and oils extractions, results of Hendy & Zaki ‘s (2012) research show
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that these areas have portrayed growth, which was materialized by an increase in their
employment rate by 0.7%. Yet it is important to emphasize that employment activities
were mostly from the skilled workers pool, as a result of the technological
advancements that these jobs require.

On the other hand since the Egyptian

agricultural sector does not stand out as one of Egypt’s comparative advantages tariff
cuts and liberalized trading activities in this sector were translated to a drastic decrease
in the production which negatively impacted the labor demand in this sector, hence
explaining the why unemployment in this sector surged by 0.5%, while the remaining
unskilled labor employed are faced with a drastic decrease in their wages. (Hendy &
Zaki, 2012)
III. Financial Sector Reforms:

Reforms in this sector mainly include reforming the financial sector by
liberalizing capital flows, and implementing a flexible currency exchange system to
attract foreign direct investment flows in to the Egyptian economy. A study by
Paramati & Nguyen (2019) studying the effects of the financial sector reforms, that are
ought to lead to the development and growth of the financial sector, on income
distribution from 1981-2014 found that the development of the financial banking
sector tends to have mixed impact on income inequality. In their research it was
evident that the results were highly dependent on how the reformed financial system
was inclusive in terms of benefiting both the rich and poor segments of the populace
through the banking credit allocation facilities. (Paramati & Nguyen, 2019) In the case
of Egypt, they report that the structural reforms that the financial sector has underwent
has indeed increased income disparities since the system favored large business as well
as the wealthy individuals of the society were as the less fortunate segments of the
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market force were crowded out and hence were not able to benefit from the credit
allocation facilities. On the other hand the results from their study shows that the
developmental advancements that the stock market has witnessed during the reforms of
the financial sector had no significant contribution to the increasing inequality.
(Paramati & Nguyen, 2019)
In regards to the increased FDI inflows induced by the financial sector reforms
however Paramati & Nguyen (2019) found that foreign inflows have a significant
negative impact on unemployment rate, on both skilled and unskilled workers, but
mainly unskilled workers which increased income disparities between the two sectors
of the labor work force. In a study by Ingham, Read, & ElKomy (2020), looking at the
sectorial impacts of foreign direct investment in Egypt, they find that as the flows of
FDIs increase, the Egyptian economy experiences growth in the manufacturing
industry on only when interacting with human capital, while it has no significant
impact on other sector counterparts. In their research as portrayed in Table 15 they find
that the manufacturing industry as well as the petroleum industry received the utmost
foreign capital flows representing 37% of the total FDI inflows. Following those top
two sectors comes the finance and retail sector which attracted roughly 676 million
EGP, and least but not last, are the IT and telecommunications sectors followed by the
agricultural sector in last place. (Ingham, Read, & ElKomy, 2020)
Table 15: FDI in flows breakdown by sector (Ingham, Read, & ElKomy, 2020)
(MP): Manufacturing and Petroleum/(FR): Financial and Retail Services/ (S):
Services/(T): Tourism/(C): Construction/(IT): Telecommunications and IT/
(A): Agriculture.
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Abouelfarag & Abed (2018) found that an increase of 1% in FDI flows in the
manufacturing and petroleum sector materialized into a 0.63% increase in real wages
of employees in this sector, where as an increase of 1% in FDI flows in the finance and
retail services sector materialized into an increase of 0.35% in real wages.
(Abouelfarag & Abed, 2018) This supports the idea that FDI induces inequality on two
levels, firstly amongst economic sectors and secondary amongst geographic sectors,
Such results indicate that FDI flows have a direct impact on the real wage, the
manufacturing sector which is mostly made up or skilled labor experience the highest
increase in the real wages while the sectors that follow experience less increases in
their wages, and it is evident that the unskilled labor sectors experience the least FDI
flows and hence relatively less increases in the real wages. This automatically induces
a wage gap between economic sectors, on the other hand functional distribution plays a
role in the Egyptian case since merits of FDI flows mostly materialize in the urban
sector Cairo which also leaves the rural parts of Egypt (upper Egypt, which is mostly
dependent on the agricultural sector) exposed to greater distortions in the distribution
of income.
On the other hand, although reforming the Egyptian financial sector brought
about staggering macro-economic growth, yet unfortunately much of the GDP and FDI
advancements occurred in sectors that did not stimulate employment opportunities, on
the contrary sectors that experienced high FDI flows witnessed the highest cutbacks in
unskilled labor employment as a result of modern machinery substitution. Those
unfortunate negative effects can exist particularly in the short term when the inflowing
foreign firms manufacturing for the domestic market lure the sales demand away from
local businesses with competitive prices of finished goods due to lower labor
headcount, hence forcing domestic firms to cut back on manufacturing which further
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induces a sense of crowding out of local firms. (Abouelfarag & Abed, 2018) While
during this period the skilled labor sector of the labor force enjoy a sense of bargaining
power when discussing their terms of employment in terms of wages, the unskilled
labor segment was left facing high unemployment as well as surging prices of essential
goods, and were becoming progressively conscious of an agonizing inequality in the
allocation of the financial merits of the financial sector reforms. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021)

4.3 Findings:
I. Gini Index:
During the analysis phase of the Egyptian case, one of the limitations faced was
the lack of computed inputs of the Gini index in the UNU-WIDER (2020) data set, the
available inputs were computed once every five years as shown in Table 16 (below)
which meant that during the periods studied no computed data was available. In order
to overcome this limitation this research utilized an interpolation equation to compute
hypothetical Gini figures based on averaged Gini figures available in the data set the
final computed scores as well as the published scores are presented in Figure 6
(below). The reason behind the averaging mechanism prior to the interpolation was to
ensure all inputs of the Gini index were considered in this study in terms of income
segments as well as geographical segments. The results of the interpolation equation
were then averaged over the studied periods to portray the results in Table 16.
Table 16: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Year

Averaged Published Gini Index
1981
1991
1996
2000
2005
2009
2011
2013
2015

35.50
32.00
39.48
34.82
31.93
29.92
30.12
40.82
31.56
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Figure 6: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Table 17: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Time Period
Consecutive Wave 2 (1977-81)
Grace Period 2 (1982-1886)
SBA (1987-1988)
Grace Period 3 (1989-1990)
Consecutive Wave 3 (1991-1998)
Grace Period 4 (1999-2015)

GINI Average
35.46
34.45
33.23
32.53
36.24
33.12

The results presented above in Table 16 and below in Figure 6 show that Egypt
recorded higher scores of the Gini index while receiving funding facilities from the
international monetary fund when compared with grace periods, with the exception of
the 1987 SBA which recorded an average score of 33.75 when compared with the two
studied consecutive waves of 1977 and 1991 which recorded an average score of 36.40
and 36.24 respectively. In fact the Gini score of the 1987 Standby Arrangement was
lower than the Grace period of 1982, from a quantitative approach this could be as a
result of the interpolation method conducted in the methodology since the time period
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of this SBA fell through the cracks of the original computed scores meaning that the
averaged score computed as 100% based on interpolation in comparison to other time
periods which included two or more original computed scores from the UNU-WIDER
(2020) data set. On the other hand from qualitative approach the low Gini Score could
be interpreted that the number of consecutive loans has a direct role in increasing
income inequality. Suggesting that the more loans a country opts to seek out in a
consecutive matter the higher level of inequality the receiving country experiences, yet
further research would be needed to further analyze the matter to better understand if
this this is an outlier due to methodological limitations or not.
Results from the Egyptian case study indicate that consecutive IFI funding
facilities tend to lead to increased income inequality. Figure 7 (below) shows that the
two consecutive waves covered within the studied period scored the two highest peaks
on the graph in comparison with the grace periods. As portrayed below after the 1997
consecutive lending wave the Gini scores fell by 2.47% indicating less inequality
during the 1982 grace period, and rose by a staggering 10.66% during the 1991
consecutive funding wave to fall 7.20% after the facilities ended.

Figure 7: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)
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I. CPI Score:
The Scores displayed in Table 18 incorporate the
Egyptian Corruption Perception Index computed data in
the Transparency International: The Global Coalition
Against Corruption (1995) data set since 1995, which
marks the date when this index. was established till 2015.
As you can see below after 2011 the CPI was reformed to
be represented by a new numerical system, since the data
set does not provide the methodological steps on how to
transform old inputs into the new ones and hence the time
period from 2012-2015 was excluded in the CPI/Gini
comparative analysis displayed in Table 19.

Table 18: Egypt’s CPI
Scores (Transparency
International: The Global
Coalition Against
Corruption, 1995)

Table 19
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Comparing the CPI to the Gini index is a crucial part of the analytical phase of
this study since it plays the major role helping to identify the weather the source of
increasing income inequality levels are as a direct result of IFI funding facilities or
otherwise attributed to the pre-existing country features of the case study. Since the
Gini index operates in an ascending matter, the higher the score the higher the level of
inequality, while the CPI operates in a descending manner, meaning the lower the
score the higher the corruption level, if the levels of corruption has a direct role in
increasing inequality a negative correlation between the two indicators ought to be
evident in the results. Which turns out to be the case for Egypt, as you can see above in
Table 19, during the consecutive wave of funding facilities in 1991-1998 Egypt’s CPI
score was 2.87 which is marks 13.6% higher levels of corruption than the scores
displayed for the grace period which marks a lower Gini score than its counterpart.
These results might suggest that for the Egyptian case preexistent country features may
have a bigger role in precipitating inequality than we anticipated.

4.4 Conclusion:
In terms of income inequality, the richest 10 % of Egyptians held 61% of total
riches during funding facilities, despite earning just 28.3% of the income. A global
report issued by Credit Suisse implied that Egypt has one of the prevalent income gaps
globally. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021) This stands in line with the empirical results displayed
in this chapter, though it may be primitive and for sure requires further analysis. Yet
when comparing Gini scores during the times of consecutive funding facilities with
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grace period intervals it is evident that funding facilities have a negative implication on
income disparities in the case of Egypt.
In the Egyptian case it is evident through the literature that External sector
reforms that incorporated trade liberalization tendencies, and financial sector reforms
that brought about the globalization of technological advancements were the main
engines responsible for the increase in income disparities. This came as a consequence
of the substitution of labor with modern machinery; this occurrence could be narrowed
to specifically the various jobs that were previously carried out by unskilled workers.
Simultaneously the financial and globalization of the financial sector seemed to enable
immense salaries and increased profits which were mostly distributed amongst a
constricted set of skilled employees and shareholders of market frontrunners. This is
demonstrated in Paramati & Nguyen’s (2019) results where they detected a strong
positive correlation between the share of total income for individuals with the top 10%
highest incomes and the sectors that experienced the staggering increase of GDP per
capita growth in the economy.
According to the literature although the public sector reforms had unfortunate
implications on the majority of the Egyptian population, specifically the middle and
(more importantly) the lower class of the society, in terms of deteriorating living
standards and amplified economic adversity yet the main driver for income inequality
in the Egyptian case remains to be the external and financial sector reforms. This was
mainly due to the fact that the revoked subsidy system worsened what was already
deteriorating as a consequence to the floatation of the Egyptian pound and the
globalization of trade, which indeed encouraged the return of foreign inflows, yet on
the down side the currency depreciated by more than 50% which harshly increased the
cost of living. (Abdel Ghafar, 2021) That being said, once more only part of my second
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hypothesis stands corrected, for the Egyptian case I was correct to anticipate that the
financial sector reforms would be a main driver for inequality, although I believed that
the public sector reforms would be the main driver yet it seems I have under estimated
the detriments of the eternal sector reforms since it seems to be prevalent as one of the
key drivers of income disparities in both the Colombian and Egyptian case.
As for the pre-existent country features, the rural/urban functional distribution
of capital as well as the variances between upper and lower Egypt seem to play a role
in the income disparities, since according to Abdel Ghafar (2021) “the average per
capita urban income is 67% higher than the average rural income, and among those
included in the top tenth percentile, a staggering 81% lives in urban areas. Therefore,
an urban citizen is seventeen times more likely to be part of the top percentile in Egypt
than a person living in the rural area”. The extent to which pre-existent country
features plays a role in income inequality in the Egyptian case needs further research,
in order to critically analyze whether IFI funding is indeed the main driver behind the
increasing levels of inequality or is it the pre-existent country features, this is
especially the case since the CPI scores for the Egyptian case study show that
corruption might have a direct role than anticipated in increasing income disparities.
Yet it is important to mention that it’s still early to conclude on this matter since the
case of Colombia supported my first hypothesis, unlike the Egyptian case, which
means that the results from the next case study on Turkey will hopefully provide an
indication to solve this nexus.
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Chapter 5: The Turkish Case Study

5.1 Introduction:
The Turkish case study is the third and final country that will be considered in
research. Its analysis shows that it is also the most intriguing case in terms of its
complexity and nature. Like the Egyptian case, Turkey began its neo-liberal trajectory
course in the 1980s, leaving behind the import substitution economic model of the
1970s, (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008). This also marks the starting period of study for
our research, which begins in 1980 till 2018. Although Turkey joined the IMF on 11
March 1947, the country began seeking out financial assistance from the Fund in
January 1961. Since then Turkey has opted for a total of 19 loans all of which were
Standby Arrangements totaling around 53.5 billion dollars. Table 20 below presents
the breakdown of the loans; the first wave of consecutive loans began in 1961 and
ended ten years later in 1971, followed by a 6-year grace period from 1972-1977. In
1978 the country began its second wave of consecutive funding to receive a total of 5
loans from 1978 till 1985, Turkey then took the second break (1986-1993) which
lasted about 8 years before opting for single SBA in 1994 which lasted for two years to
end in 1996. The third grace period was from 1997-1998 after which Turkey sought
out 3 final consecutive SBAs, one of which included a Supplemental Reserve Facility
(highlighted in green), from the period 1999-2008. Since then the country has been
abstaining from transacting from the Fund marking the fourth and final grace period
we will be looking at in our research (2009-2018).
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Table 20: Detailed breakdown of the Turkish Lending Commitments with the Fund (International
Monetary Fund, 2021)

Facility
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Supplemental Reserve Facility
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Standby Arrangement
Total Number of loans

Begin Date
End Date
Amount in USD
11-May-2005 10-May-2008
9,449,058,787.49
4-Feb-2002
3-Feb-2005
18,184,861,172.57
21-Dec-2000 20-Dec-2001
8,203,696,769.58
22-Dec-1999
4-Feb-2002
13,125,914,831.33
8-Jul-1994
7-May-1996
865,898,492.02
4-Apr-1984
3-Apr-1985
319,127,208.36
24-Jun-1983
3-Apr-1984
319,127,208.36
18-Jun-1980 17-Jun-1983
1,772,928,935.33
19-Jul-1979 17-Jun-1980
354,585,787.07
24-Apr-1978
18-Jul-1979
425,502,944.48
17-Aug-1970 16-Aug-1971
127,650,883.34
1-Jul-1969 30-Jun-1970
38,295,265.00
1-Mar-1968 31-Dec-1968
38,295,265.00
15-Feb-1967 31-Dec-1967
38,295,265.00
1-Feb-1966 31-Dec-1966
30,494,377.69
1-Feb-1965 31-Dec-1965
30,494,377.69
15-Feb-1964 31-Dec-1964
30,494,377.69
15-Feb-1963 31-Dec-1963
30,494,377.69
30-Mar-1962 31-Dec-1962
43,968,637.60
1-Jan-1961 31-Dec-1961
53,187,868.06
19
53,482,372,831.35

Table 21: Time frame breakdown of the Turkish lending commitments with the Fund

Period
First Consecutive Wave
First Grace Period
Second Consecutive wave
Second Grace Period
SBA
Third Grace Period
Third Consecutive Wave
Fourth Grace Period

Time Frame
1961-1971
1972-1977
1978-1985
1986-1993
1994-1996
1997-1998
1999-2008
2009-2018

As shown above in Table 21, the time frame which our study will be focused
on covers mainly 2 waves of consecutive funding namely the second and third, as well
as the single SBA that Turkey sought out and in-between those waves 3 grace periods.
This will create an analytical window that allows us to compare the levels of income
inequality during consecutive waves of lending programs with grace periods in order to
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establish if IFI lending facilities have a direct impact on income inequality patterns in
Turkey.
The main reason for choosing the 1980s as the starting point of our study
period is mainly due to the fact that this decade was the turning point for major policy
changes on a domestic level as well as an international level. As explained in our
introduction above, the 1980s are the period during which the policy changes that the
IMF began to adopt post the international debt crisis began to appear, which mainly
included imbedding the three pillars of conditionality in their loans to ensure that the
Funds were properly allocated to treat the main causes behind the recipient countries’
economic fallouts. On the domestic level, this time frame also marks the departure
from import substitution economic systems, setting the course towards neo-liberal
globalized economic regimes. For the Turkish case the neoliberal paradigm began to
dominate the public agenda mainly during this time frame powered by and export-led
economic system in the country, before which the country primarily adopted an
industrialization plan through import substitution policies led by intensive
governmental intervention in the economic system which created a local economic
model greatly dependent on foreign borrowing and imports with inadequate capability
to export. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
The export-led economic system was set in motion after the 1980’s military
coupe that took place in Turkey, the new political power was able to partially
implement the imposed neo-liberal policy conditions of the IMF by suppressing the
Turkish civil society to eliminate public resistance. This was mainly carried out by
establishing and implementing an anti-labor legislation in the 1982 Turkish
constitution, which shut down the largest labor union in the country, this was also the
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period that marked the beginning of the massive shrinkage in real wages in the Turkish
case. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
During the second consecutive wave of funding the IMF granted a Standby
Arrangement program in June 1980, to mainly help the Turkish government resolve
the balance of payments crisis in the country, which came about as a result of the
previous economic regime that dominated Turkey. Conditionality imbedded in this
package mainly targeted liberalization suggestions that the local government was ought
to implement on the domestic and international level to shift the new economic
dynamic towards a more globalized nature. The three pillars of conditionality included
reforming the public sector through the elimination of subsidies and price regulations,
reducing the role of the public sector in commerce while emphasizing growth in the
private sector by stimulating private investments and savings as well as reforming the
taxation system to bump up public revenue. External sector reforms included
implanting new policies to liberalize foreign trade by reducing tariffs in order to
integrate the Turkish economy in to the global market system. As for the financial
sector reforms conditions in this section mainly targeted the facilitation of capital
transfer exchange regulations to attract foreign direct investment inflows, as well as the
privatization the Central Bank. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
According to the studies by Elveren & Galbraith (2008) and Evrensel (2004)
the reform process in Turkey focused mostly on the External and Financial sectors
during the 1980s, where the country first began by liberalizing its trade regime
followed by reforming the financial sector through liberalizing its capital account to
introduce capital mobility when entering/existing the Turkish market in the late 1980s.
(Elveren, 2010)
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5.2 Theoretical Implications of the Three Pillars of Conditionality in Turkey:
I.

Public Sector Reforms:

It was very intriguing to discover that the local government did not implement the
public sector reforms suggested by the International Monetary Fund, specifically the
reforms concerned with the privatization of state owned entities and businesses, which
remained very limited despite the conditions imbedded within disbursed loans. State
intervention in the economy continued to be an occurring habit and subsidies were not
deregulated as instructed by the fund, on the contrary a subsidy system was in fact
implemented to support export oriented businesses and corporations. (Evrensel, 2004)
The above-imposed reforms were placed in order to play a vital and important role in
reducing and curbing the Turkish fiscal deficit, which had widened and worsened by
the latter end of the 1980s as a result of the government behavior in abstaining from
implementing the public sector reforms. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
By 1994 the Turkish economy witnessed a severe economic crisis mainly as a
consequence of the noncompliance with the public sector reforms, which greatly
weighed on the fiscal budget given its unsustainable nature coupled with the growing
external deficit. It was only then that the government sought out IFI assistance to
resolve its budget disequilibria that was mainly focused on public sector reforms and
fiscal adjustments. The privatization movement of the public sector began after that
SBA and mainly lasted till 2001, this movement decreased the share of public
enterprises from 36% in the 1980s to reach levels as low as 10% in 2001 in the
manufacturing sector. (Turkey - Memorandum of Economic Policies, June 26, 1998 -Letter of Intent, 1998) Hence creating instantly a wage gap between employers in the
public sector and the private sector and with it driving up the unemployment rate as a
result of the occurring layoffs that the public sector witnessed during this period.
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Figure 8 (below) shows that since the 1994 SBA the employment levels of the public
sector has decreased over time while employment of the private sector started to
absorb the unemployment, yet displaced employees were faced with unequal income
opportunities depending on their skill levels. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
During these waves of funding Turkey also witnessed a change in the taxation
system, which was more prone to benefit the rich after the government failed to
implement a redistributive taxation method. Such methods aimed at increasing public
revenues when accompanied with a negative trend in wage ceilings sparked a wage
gap between the public sector and the private sector of the economy and specifically if
one was to compare the manufacturing sector in both the public and private sphere
hence ultimately leading to income disparities between both sectors. (Elveren &
Galbraith, 2008)
Figure 8: Number of Employees in the Manufacturing Sector (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)

Studies by Elveren & Galbraith (2008) and Elveren (2010) conclude in their
findings that while the public sector has exhibited unaffected inequality during the
period at both the regional and provincial levels, yet the decreasing portion of the
public sector in the economy post the 1994 downplays any positive weight it can bare
when improving income disparities. It is important to highlight that in both the
previous case studies; the theoretical implications of reforming the public sector played
a major role when it came to income inequality. We found that curbing public

Farag 75
expenditure while increasing public revenue had a negative impact on income equality
which resulted in an increased wage gap between public sector employees and private
sector employees mainly due to the wage ceilings which were imposed on the public
sector to decrease its costs. In previous case studies we also found that public sector
subsidy reductions additionally had a major part contributing to the increase of income
inequality since it mainly affected the lower class strata of the population, hence
further deteriorating their living standards by affecting the their spending habits which
widened the gap between social classes. The fact that the Turkish government
abstained from implementing reforms in this pillar ought to have an effect on the levels
of inequality in the country.
II.

External Sector Reforms:
In order to integrate the Turkish economy in the international market the IMF

imposed reforms in this sector, which were mainly implemented by liberalizing the
trade regime in the country. The local government complied with the external policy
restructuring process mainly by reducing tariffs on imports and removing price
controls on goods and services in the product market. Although this might have created
a better setting for a globalized Turkish economy, which theoretically according to the
neo-liberal economic theory brings about economic efficiency, yet in the Turkish case
the price of an integrated export led economic dynamic was inflation, caused by the
depreciation of the domestic currency. All of which are key generators of income
inequality especially for the low income strata of the Turkish labor force, and what
makes the situation even dire was the suppression of real wages in export intensive
sectors. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
For example when we looked into one of the main exporting sectors, we found that
according to Elveren (2010) the trade liberalization reforms imposed by the IMF, had a
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negative impact on textile industry in terms of the real wages of the workforce
employed in this sector, which were reduced by 20% in comparison with other
industries in the whole Turkish manufacturing sector. This was mainly due to cost
reduction strategies implemented by domestic enterprises (Elveren, 2010). In fact when
compared with the major protected import substitution sectors such as transportation,
research by Elveren, Ornek, & Akel (2012) show that while the wages of the textile
industry fell, other sectors such as transportation witnessed an increase in wages as a
result of the tariffs and barrier protection measures on import substitution sectors.
(Elveren, Ornek, & Akel, 2012)
Another explanation behind the wage gap between the import and export sectors of
the economy also goes back to the fact that the Turkish economy is highly dependent
on capital-intense intermediate goods which are in fact a complementary addition to
the domestic Turkish produced goods rather than being substitutes for them. Hence the
import sectors usually complement the produced goods available in the Turkish market
meaning that cost reduction strategies are not as severe as competition is much lower
when compared to the export intense sectors. (Elveren, Ornek, & Akel, 2012)
Another breeder of inequality in the exporting sectors of the Turkish economy

Figure 9: The Evolution of Wage Gap between Skilled and
unskilled labor. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016)

Farag 77
during the period 1980-2001 was as a result of the income disparities amongst white
and blue-collar workers, due to the skilled biased nature of the newly imported
technologies which saturated the exporting manufacturing sectors. Although this
contributed to technological upgrades in the local market yet its evident from Meschi,
Taymaz, & Vivarelli’s (2016) research that this was greatly associated with an increase
in the wage gap between blue and white collar works as portrayed in Figure 9 (above).
Which shows that the demand for the skilled labor in export manufacturing sector
surged during this period. Their results show that the advanced technological
machinery created a heightened premium for the skilled workers who enjoyed a 0.23%
higher wages than unskilled workers working for the same company\firm. (Meschi,
Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016)
From another end according to Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli (2016) the trade
liberalization reforms had a positive impact on the productivity of the Turkish
economy due to the newly introduced competition in the market. Foreign firms that
became competition to the domestic market had a spill over effect on local firms in
terms of introducing new technologies and know-hows of copyrights and licensing, all
of which leveled up the development and maturity of the local market by creating new
opportunities to draw foreign capital, technology and investment. Yet once again this
development was not without a cost, research shows that the globalization of the local
Turkish economy in the international market through the liberalization of trade brought
challenges for the domestic market. Specifically due to the technological
advancements that were introduced locally, although this instance is a bit similar to
that of the Colombian case in terms of the technological spill over effect yet it is
important to highlight that the key difference that is evident in the Turkish case which
makes the effects more dire and severe, is the fact that those advancements were
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mainly brought about from neighboring states which for Turkey included highly
developed EU countries. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016)
Even though the intentions of the policy reforms in this sector aimed to establish an
economic dynamic locally that preforms efficiently, yet technological advancements
were namely associated with increasing unemployment in the labor force mainly for
the unskilled labor strata as a result of the labor saving nature that those new
technologies were introducing specifically in the traditional manufacturing sectors of
the Turkish economy. It is also important to highlight that the technological
advancements have induced a deepening in the income inequality nexus of the Turkish
population by also increasing the employment rate and wage premium of the skilled
workers in comparison to the unskilled or blue collar workers. (Meschi, Taymaz, &
Vivarelli, 2016)
This came about as a result of two main channels from one end new machinery was
beginning to substitute the need to employ blue collar works, making the production
line of finished goods more cost efficient while increasing the quality of finished goods
in order to better compete with the increased foreign competition when it came to
exporting sectors, which ultimately breed high unemployment for the blue collar strata
of the labor force, findings of previous research shows that a 10% increase in
machinery investment was associated with a 0.18% fallback of unskilled labor
indicating that blue collar workers that were directly involved in factory production,
are those that were more likely to be displayed by new machinery. While on the other
end the demand for white-collar workers began to increase in order to manage and
maintain the new technology. As a result this created a hostile environment for
unskilled workers where the dynamics of the labor market began to favor a certain
sector and partially crowded out the latter as a result of technological advancements,
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hence the Turkish economy started to experience high levels of unemployment coupled
with increasing inequality within the labor force of turkey during the years of
implementation of such neo-liberal imposed reforms. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli,
2016)
III.

Financial Sector Reforms:

The financial sector reforms imposed by the IMF were the third pillar of
conditionality to be implemented by the Turkish government after the external sector
reforms. Policy changes in this pillar began in the late 1980s specifically in 1989 and
early1990s after inflation had reached unprecedented levels, which was one of the
main driving forces behind the eroding in real wages (Elveren, Ornek, & Akel, 2012).
To address the high inflation and currency deregulation mainly caused as a side
effect of the trade liberalization policy reforms, the government sought out SBAs from
the IMF and complied with its conditionality to fully liberalize the capital account to
create flexible capital mobility, coupled with a tightening monetary policy to induce a
disinflationary process. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008) The Final wave of consecutive
funding which began in December 1999 entailed major implementation of financial
sector reforms, which mainly included implementing a tight exchange rate and
monetary policies, to better foster an improved financial sector to liberalize and
develop the Turkish economy. A year later the Supplemental Reserve Facility in 2000
was disbursed to Turkey as a life line to balance out the severe capital outflows that the
economy witnessed after the major banking crisis which occurred in the late part of
2000. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
The 2004 Standby Arrangement brought about the boldest neoliberal reforms in the
financial sector, which brought down the inflation and increased the economic growth
rate by spiking interest rates. This ultimately attracted hot money inflows, which
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brought about exponential growth in the Turkish economy that led to the over
appreciation of the local currency this was coupled with an improvement in the real
wages of workers mainly in the financial sector (Elveren, Ornek, & Akel, 2012). Yet
the growth exhibited was considered as redundant growth because it was chiefly
founded on speculative financial inflows (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008), where foreign
investors take advantage of the high interest rate differential between foreign currency
and the Turkish lira hence, opting to invest in interest rate instruments to accumulate
capital gains and accruals on their funds.
Although the liberalization of capital accounts as well as the reformed monetary
policy aimed at combating the high inflation indeed succeeded to attract rapid foreign
investment in the financial sector of the Turkish economy, yet it has been proven that
such inorganic growth stipulates income disparities between social classes in the
Turkish population strata mainly because of two points. Firstly, according to Elveren,
Ornek, & Akel (2012) this type of foreign direct investment increased the volatility of
capital flows in Turkey, where inflows and outflows of the now liberalized capital
account was based on financial speculation rather than stable growth. This inturn had a
vast impact on the real wages of employees in this sector since at times of capital
outflows the workers weitnessed a dire erosion in income. Secondly the findings of
Elveren & Galbraith (2008) show that another main generator behind the increasing
inequality caused by the financial sector reforms mainly goes back to the
disinflationary policies that Turkey began to implement through its neo-liberal
monetary policy which opted to increase interest rates to combat inflation. As a result
domestic investors, which make up the top quintile took advantage of high interest
rates to increase their wealth by investing in the financial/banking sector to increase
their share of non-wage income. Meanwhile the remaining low/middle income of the
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population strata were left with high interest rates when it came to borrowing
instruments from the financial/banking sector hence making it increasingly difficult of
finance SMEs which consequently increased income disparities in Turkey.
Although financial sector reforms have proven to have a negative impact on
income equality in the financial sector, research by Elveren, Ornek, & Akel (2012)
shows that, as a result of the increased and rapid financial sector reforms which Turkey
implemented under the guidance of the IMF, that FDI flows had increased from $112
million in 2000 to $2.8 billion in 2001 and by 2005 it had reached $10 billion (Ucal,
Haug, & Bilgin, 2016). This increase in FDI flows had a vast weight attached to it as it
certainly increased the employment patterns of both skilled and unskilled labor, by
introducing new job opportunities for both strata of the labor force specifically in the
sectors of chemicals, machinery and equipment, glass and pottery, metals, and paper
(Elveren & Galbraith, 2008).
In fact it is evident from the research by Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli (2016) that
the increased number of FDIs which were brought about as a result of the financial
sector reforms played a major role in balancing out the high unemployment caused by
the trade liberalization reforms, in terms of making up for the unemployment of blue
collar workers.
However Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli (2016) also specified in their research that
the increased foreign direct investment has also created a demand for the skilled labor
strata their findings show that while FDIs increased the wages of blue collar workers
by 20% it also increased the wages of white collar workers by 30%, indicating that this
could be the main generator behind the amplified wage gap between white vs blue
collar workers. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016)
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To conclude on this section it is important to highlight that Elveren, Ornek, & Akel
(2012), found that the net effect of the financial sector reforms which mainly brought
about the increase in foreign direct investments remains positive in terms of improving
income inequality in the Turkish case this claim is also supported by Ucal, Haug, &
Bilgin (2016) in their study where they found that FDIs had a positive impact on
reducing income inequality particularly in the short run. Their findings suggest that in
the short run the Gini index of Turkey decreased by 0.33 units for every 1% increase of
FDI volumes as a share in the GDP. (Ucal, Haug, & Bilgin, 2016)
A plausible explanation for this occurrence would be that, despite the various
channels discussed above which induced a skewed income distribution, it was evident
that employment patterns that were exercised by foreign firms in the local Turkish
market absorbed the abundant unemployed labor force, which became evident after the
external sector reforms and the decreasing activity of the public sector which was
induced by the privatization movement under the public sector reforms. (Elveren,
Ornek, & Akel, 2012)

5.3 Findings:
I.

Gini Index:

One of the recurring limitations of this research remains
to be the scarcity of published Gini Index in the UNUWIDER (2020) data set. Table 22 (on the right) portrays
Turkey’s Averaged Gini index scores for the available
years, as it is evident that big chunks of data is missing
for the years covered in this research. As a solution I
opted to use an interpolation equation in order to produce

Table 22: Turkey’s Averaged Available Gini Index
Scores for the Studied Period (UNU-WIDER, 2020)
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synthesized scores for the missing inputs based on the existent published scores, to
give us a better idea if IFI lending patterns have a direct impact on the Gini index
scores. Table 23 provides us with clustered averaged scores (pooling together the
published and interpolated scores) for the time periods of consecutive funding visa vie
grace periods in order to help subjectively assess the studied indicators at hand. The
reason behind the averaging method we choose to adopt serves two key purposes,
firstly to ensure that all geographical regions are being taken into considerations in
terms of their scoring, and that there is little room for a sense of crowding out of
computed scores of urban vs rural regions of the country. The second purpose of the
averaging method is to minimalize the impact of outliers of the quantitative materials
used from the UNU-WIDER (2020) data set.
Table 23

Figure 11: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Figure 10: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)

Figure 11: (UNU-WIDER, 2020)
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As portrayed in Figure 11 above, which couples both the interpolation and
averaging methods used it is evident that over the long run wage inequality has
been decreasing in Turkey. This is only valid if one compares the Second wave of
consecutive funding with the single SBA sought out as well as the Third
consecutive wave of funding. However if on subjectively analyzes the consecutive
funding waves with the grace periods that follow them, then one could draw a
conclusion that during IFI funding facilities inequality seems to be higher than
during grace periods which show on the graph that the average of interpolated
Gini scores seem to be significantly lower during break periods. This could be as a
result of easing conditions that occur after the aggressive reforms the government
undertook whilst under the imbursements to portray their compliance with the
conditionality of funding facilities.
Yet it is important to highlight that the fact that the overall decrease of income
inequality in Turkey over the years stands in line with the findings of the
theoretical implications of the three pillars of conditionality discussed above. To
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elaborate on this point as seen in both the Colombian case and the Egyptian case
the greatest factor which seemed to breed the highest inequality was the public
sector reforms, the fact that the Turkish government choose to refrain from
complying with conditions associated with that sector until it was absolutely
necessary, and when they choose to go through with them they were performed
cautiously and with a minimal level would explain why there is a general decline
in income inequality. To add to that as mentioned above at the end of the financial
sector reforms part, the net effect of the increasing FDI flows into the Turkish
economy was positive in terms of decreasing over all income inequality since
introducing new foreign businesses created new and better opportunities for the
labour force, hence absorbing the inequality and unemployment shocks of the
external sector reforms caused by trade liberalization.
II. CPI Score:
Table 24 lists the available CPI scores for Turkey
since the index was established, inputs post 2011 will
not be incorporated in the analysis phase of this
research study, since as shown from the 2012 figure
that the index began adopting a new method to
calculate country scores. In order to unify the
statistical data for this research it was for that reason
that we choose to look at the time period from 19952011 and compare the findings with the Gini index
scores, to determine if preexistent levels of
corruption in Turkey has a direct role in the

Table 24:
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increasing inequality patterns that were displayed above.
Table 25: Clustered CPI Scores for Studied Time Periods

Time Period
SBA
Grace Period 3 (1997-1998)
Consecutive Wave 3 (1999-2008)
Grace Period 4 (2009-2018) CPI till 2011*

Average CPI Score
3.82
3.31
3.65
4.33

Figure 12

As portrayed in Table 25 and Figure 12 above the averaged CPI scores of
Turkey have dropped from 3.82 during the SBA period to 3.31 during the third
grace period, indicating that during 1997-1998 the Turkish populace were exposed
to higher levels of corruption when compared to the SBA time frame. This trend
was then reversed to an upward trend during the Third wave of consecutive funding
followed by the fourth grace period, indicating that corruption levels began to
improve once more under the third wave before shooting higher once they ended.
Although those limited results portray that over time since 1997-2011 that CPI
scores has been gradually improving, indicating that the level of corruption has been
generally decreasing over time, which fits with the overall decreasing levels of
inequality, meaning that from a macro level one could conclude that there is indeed
a causal relationship between the preexistent corruption levels of the country and
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the levels of inequality the populace experiences. Yet if we zoom in on those
findings and analyze them on a micro level, we would find that during the SBA
which scored a CPI of 3.82 the Gini index scores 46.051 indicated a higher level of
inequality when compared with the third grace period which scored a CPI of 3.31
indicating higher levels of corruption yet the Gini index score was at 42.211 which
was lower than that of the SBA’s Gini score.

5.4 Conclusion:
According to the literature, during the Turkish import substitution economic
regime in the 1970s inequality declined. Post the implementation of the neo-liberal
policies imposed by the IMF in their loan policy reform conditions, inequality began to
increase in the 1080s, and specifically from 1987 to 1994. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
In terms of functional distribution in the Turkish case according to Elveren
(2010) approximately 61% of entire populace is clustered in five urbanized regions,
specifically Aegean, Mediterranean, West Anatolia, Istanbul, and Southeast Anatolia.
The remaining 7 provinces cover only 39% of the populace. Research shows that
income disparities are notably higher in urban areas, where the urban/rural discrepancy
describes more than 10% of the entire income inequality in Turkey. The major part of
income disparities in the Turkish case is caused by the fact that developed cities tend to
have a substantial share of the manufacturing industry, if one was to compare the
urbanization rate in Istanbul which is considered a developed city with the Black Sea
region (a rural area), one would find that the urbanization can reach as high as 91% in
Istanbul, while dropping to 49% in the rural area. (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008)
Like the Egyptian case, functional distribution seemed to have a role on
inequality on the Turkish case since research highlights that metropolitan areas were
amongst the highest earnings areas and the areas with the greatest inequality, when
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compared with the emerging market regions of Turkey which make up 73% of the
manufacturing labour force which pay the price of the increased neo-liberal
implemented policies through suffering from lower wages. Yet as mentioned the
urban-rural nexus only displays 10% of the total income inequality nexus of the
Turkish case. That being said along with the results obtained from the CPI index
above we can conclude that for the Turkish case, results stand in line to support
hypotheses number one, which is although pre-existent country features may have an
impact on the levels of inequality exposure a populace faces, the role of funding
assistance sponsored by IFIs indeed did act as a significant catalyst deteriorating the
conditions that are already in place, hence providing the main explanation to the
further widening of income distribution of the country.
What was intriguing to find though was how the main source behind income
disparities in both previous case studies substantially affected the outcome of income
inequality in Turkey on the long run. As witnessed above in the line graphs (Figure 8
& 9), the Turkish case has proved that abstaining from the public sector reforms until it
was absolutely necessary yields improved income equality between the population
strata. This hence partially stands in line with the second hypothesis, since it proves
that reforms in the public sector greatly impacts the level of income disparities in the
country, and since the Turkish government abstained from reforming this sector
inequality levels were controlled up to a certain extent. Yet the Turkish results have
shown that the second part of the hypothesis two stands to be corrected, since the
external sector reforms yielded the highest damage to income inequality when it came
to the Turkish case. This was specifically the fact when compared with the financial
sector reforms, which yielded a positive impact on income equality in Turkey to the
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extent that it had a positive netting effect in reducing the negative weight imposed on
the workforce as a result of the external sector reforms.
As with our other case studies our findings suggest that inequality seems to
increase in the presence of subsequent funding programs provided by the IMF, this
claim is also supported by Evrensel’s (2004) findings for the Turkish case where he
claimed that typically Turkey seeks out new IMF programs in crueler economic
circumstances than when it sought out the program before. (Evrensel, 2004)
The findings of this chapter therefore suggest that trade liberalization provided
an efficient production environment in the manufacturing sector of the economy but
the merits of this process unfortunately was countered by layoff patters of unskilled
labor as machines began to replace their jobs. Although this was better for economic
growth, yet led to increased income inequality between skilled and unskilled labor.
Although FDIs compensated for this occurrence by creating new job opportunities for
the Turkish labor force yet the incentives and bargaining power for skilled labor were
higher hence increasing the wage gap between the two types of workers in the Turkish
manufacturing sector. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016)
Skill-based technological change theory is based on the assumption of “capital
skill complementary”, suggesting that establishments’ amplified demand for white
collar labor is mainly propelled by the penetration of new technologies into
modernized production lines, hence explaining the reason behind increased demand for
higher skilled operators. (Meschi, Taymaz, & Vivarelli, 2016) This theoretical theory
seems to hold for all three case studies chosen for our research predominantly the
Turkish case since the tech advancements were more due to the geographical region of
the
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surrounded
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developed

EU
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Chapter 6: The Conclusion:
6.1: Overview:
Income inequality has become one of the key topics of discussion amongst
policy makers since the later part of the 1980s and mostly mid-1990s, during which
decision makers both internationally and nationally became aware that the matter is a
crucial dimension of state welfare. The importance of this subject rests on its role in
curbing poverty and improving the living conditions of the poor, which if left
unchecked could lead to weak economic growth in countries. This research study
looked in to the effects of the three main pillars of structural adjustment policies
imbedded in IFI funding facilities on income inequality in three specific cases;
Colombia, Egypt and Turkey.
For the Colombian case the findings of this study displayed that the neo-liberal
IFI adjustment policies had a direct role in increasing income inequality within the
Colombian labor force. Since the levels of inequality seemed to specifically increase
when Colombia was under the spells of lending facilities when compared with levels
of inequality during grace periods. Distortions of income became more prominent as
the time period of the funding facility increased, suggesting that as conditionality
within the loans became harsher during elongated facilities, so did the negative impact
on income equality. We also found that for the Colombian case the pre-existent
country features; i.e. corruption and functional distribution had no significant direct
impact on the levels of income disparities that the Colombian populace has faced. This
was the case after the CPI results displayed that the grace period marked higher levels
of corruption yet lower levels of inequality in the Colombian case, while the
consecutive waves of IFI funding exhibited lower levels of corruption and higher
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levels of income inequality. If there is to be a conclusion drawn on the effects if IFI
funding on corruption, then one could conclude by stating that the policy conditions
imbedded in IFI lending facilities seem to have a positive impact on the levels of
corruption in the Colombian case, yet the levels of corruption does not seem to impact
on the levels of income disparities as much as the conditionality imbedded in the loans
do.
For the Egyptian case the findings of this study show that like the Colombian
case conditionality embedded in funding facilities had a negative impact on income
disparities, where the Egyptian populace faced the highest income inequality Gini
Scores during the Second and Third waves of consecutive funding when compared
with grace periods. Once again like the Colombian case, Egypt exhibited higher levels
of income disparities during elongated loans (medium to long term), confirming that
the harsher that conditions imbedded in the lending facilities that higher the inequality
the country tends to face. As for the pre-existent country features, observing the CPI
averaged scores of Egypt and comparing them with the Gini scores, shows that
corruption might have a role in precipitating inequality in Egypt, suggesting a different
outcome than that of Colombia and Turkey. This may be due to the lack of computed
data or otherwise due to the primitive nature of this research, yet regardless it is a
result that is ought to be reported so that other research studies could contribute and
further look into the subject.
As for the Turkish case the findings of this study portray that like the
Colombian and the Egyptian case conditionality embedded in funding facilities
provided by international financial institutions have a negative impact on income
equality. Yet it is important to highlight that in the Turkish case this is only the evident
if you analyze the Gini scores on a micro level; on a macro level, however, it is
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apparent that on the long run the level of income inequality seems to have improved
during the late 1990s up till 2018. The Turkish case presents its self with different
findings mainly due to the different implementation methods of the structural
adjustment policy conditions, which from my perspective holds the credit to why the
on the longer run the levels of inequality have been improving in the Turkish society. It
also stands in line with the findings the Colombian case exhibited, when we compared
the levels of inequality during the 1970s period prior to the conditionality reform that
the IMF started to implement with the post 1980s era after the policy conditionality
became part of the lending facilities programs, when we found that loans during the
1980s stipulated higher income inequality levels when compared with the loans that
didn’t included conditions during the 1970s period.
This shows that neo-liberal structural reform policies that the IMF imposes
upon recipient countries have had an overall negative impact on income equality, as
evident in the Colombian and Egyptian case. The Turkish case reinforced this
conclusion since, as the Turkish government abstained from implementing one of the
main three pillars of conditionality, the levels of income inequality in the country
improved on the longer run.

6.2: Research Questions and Hypothesis:
I.

R1, H1:
To answer the first research question: Is the inequality level of countries that are

persistently dependent on International Financial Institutions’ funding a direct
consequence of financial assistance? I hypothesized in the introduction that, although
pre-existent country features may have an impact on the levels of inequality exposure a
populace faces, the role of funding assistance sponsored by IFIs will act as a
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significant catalyst deteriorating the conditions that are already in place, hence
providing the main explanation to the further widening of income distribution. The
findings of Colombia and Turkey stand in line with my hypothesis, while the findings
of Egypt suggest otherwise, especially that corruption might have a possible direct
impact on income inequality in Egypt. Yet it is important to note that Egypt was the
only country that exhibited such findings, whereas Colombia’s findings portrayed that
IFI lending facilities had a positive impact in decreasing corruption while having a
negative impact on income equality, and the same could be said about the Turkish
case, even if in this case the relationship is less significant when compared to the
Colombian one.

As for the functional distribution variable, in the Colombian case the distribution of
the labor force across rural vs urban areas did not have a direct impact on income
inequality, and the same could be said about the Turkish case as it only represents 10%
of the total inequality present in Turkey, hence one could conclude that the rest may be
attributed to the IFI policy conditions imbedded in funding facilities. The Egyptian
case however displays results that add prominent weight to the pre-existent country
features, both when studying the CPI and the functional distribution of capital across
geographical regions in the country. Hence further research is surely required in order
to establish a clear-cut answer to whether the main driver of income inequality is
attributed to IFI lending facilities and their conditionality or to pre-existent country
features.
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II.

R2, H2:
To answer the second research question: Which of the three structural reform

pillars discussed in the conditionality debate have the most significant impact on
inequality? I hypothesized in the introduction that, government expenditure reforms
and financial sector reforms convey the most prominent weight on the validity of
income distribution, as they are the two pillars that are most likely to directly impact
the poorest segments of the populace. Findings from all three case studies suggest that
the external sector reforms had a recurring role to play as a main driver on the
increasing income inequality in all three instances. This finding stands in line with the
skill-based technological change theory, which explains why in all three case studies
external sector reforms had a direct impact on the surging levels of inequality.
As for the public sector structural adjustment policies, results from the Colombian
and Turkish case study seem to stand in line with the second hypothesis. In the
Colombian case the main drivers of income inequality during the studied period were
mainly caused by the neo-liberal structural reforms imposed to curb the government
expenditure to fix the fiscal deficit, and the external sector reforms imposed to
liberalize trade. In the Turkish case however, as discussed above findings suggest that
since the local government abstained from complying with the neo-liberal public sector
reforms, the country has exhibited an improved income inequality scores in the long
run indicating that once more government expenditure plays a crucial part in taming
income disparities in the case studies.
As for the Egyptian case, although the public sector reforms had unfortunate
implications on income equality in the country, specifically on the middle and more
importantly the lower class of the society in terms of deteriorating living standards and
amplified economic adversity, yet the main driver for income inequality in the
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Egyptian case remains to be the external and financial sector reforms. Which stands to
be the only case study out of the three cases that exhibits findings that don’t heavily
weigh on the public sector reforms, yet it is also the only country that portrays the
negative impact of the financial sector reforms when compared to the Colombian case
which didn’t exhibit a significant relationship between inequality and the neo-liberal
financial sector reforms, and the Turkish case which proved that the neo-liberal
financial sector reforms have a net positive impact in absorbing the negative effects of
the external sector reforms imposed on Turkey.
III. Other Findings:
Other findings that surfaced during the analysis phase of this research study include
the fact that for all three cases the levels of inequality seem to worsen as funding
facilities are consecutive or are medium term loans. This could be due to the harsh
conditionality imbedded in the loans that are of restricting nature, but further research
is required in order to investigate this matter further. Another finding that appeared to
be noticeable was the possibility that the neo-liberal policy structural reform conditions
might have a direct impact on levels of corruption., Both Colombia and Turkey
exhibited CPI scores that suggest that during lending facilities the studied countries
experience less corruption when compared with grace periods, which might indicate
that financial assistance provided by the IMF might have a direct role in decreasing
corruption. This could be attributed to the fact that the conditionality imbedded within
those loans ensures that the funds are allocated and spent where they ought to be,
instead of having them wasted to corruption or misallocations.

Farag 96

6.3 Limitations:
I.

Indices:
Further research is required in order to support or falsify those findings,

especially given the limitations evident in this research study which rage mainly from
the fact that the quantitative aspect was based on secondary resources such as the Gini
and CPI indices rather than on primary survey resources conducted in the field. That
being said it is important to highlight that another downside of utilizing such indices go
back to two main points. Firstly is the lack of computed scores, as exhibited in the Gini
Index, in order to fill in missing scores we opted to use an interpolation method in
order to carry out the research and this was the case for all three case studies. On the
other hand for the CPI although the occurrence of missing data was far less in
comparison with the Gini, yet the Index was established during 1995, hence leaving
out approximately ±15 years since the starting years of our studied period. The second
and most prominent limitation was that both indicators do not tend to portray the most
accurate representation of such comprehensive country qualities, and hence it is for
that reason why this research study remains to be primitive in nature and will require
other researches to elaborate on its topic and discuss it further using primary resources
to support or refute the findings mentioned above.
II. Time Period:
Time period limitations also surfaced while conducting this research study on
two different levels. Firstly on a macro level, in terms of the studied time frame for
each country selection, the fact that every case study was unique when it came to
approaching the trajectory course towards implementing neo-liberal policy reforms
imposed by the IMF, made it difficult determine and utilize a unilateral time frame for
all studied countries. This was mainly because the neo-liberal policy reforms that the
studied countries undertook were not imposed until they sought out IFI funding
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assistance meaning that the starting point for each country differed from the other
according to their economic performance and why they decided to seek financial
assistance from the IMF to begin with. Another reason why it was difficult to have a
standardized time frame for all case studies was attributed to the last published Gini
scores, which mainly marked the end of the time period studies for each country
accordingly. Although it this methodological approach portrayed quantitative results
which were in line with the qualitative findings mentioned for each case studies but it
still doesn’t deny the fact that the different time frames for each case study does not
account for the international context which may have changed from one time period to
another.
On a micro level time periods also caused another limitation in regards to
comparing ‘grace periods’ with ‘funding periods’, although once again the quantitative
results rendered from this research study for each country were in line with the
qualitative findings, yet when comparing both ‘periods’ I did not account for the
continued influence of the imposed policy reforms during the grace periods. Meaning
that the differences between both time periods are not clear cut and may have direct or
indirect influence on one another, hence further research regarding this matter is
needed in order to support or falsify this research’s findings.

6.4 Policy Implications:
On a final note, since the most prominent and evident sector of reforms that
induced inequality in all three case studies were the external sector reforms which
imposed the neo-liberal trade liberalization policy conditions. If I were to provide
advice to policy and decision makers regarding this topic, my advice would be to
invest in the development of the labour force in their local country. Investing in their
education and expertise could carry out such development, by doing so policy makers
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would ensure to eliminate the surge in inequality levels as a reaction to machinery
displacement that unskilled workers face. Investing in education and labor
development would also reduce the income inequality caused by the skilled bias,
which is stipulated as a result of rising FDI flows and increased competition in the
local market in exporting and importing sectors. In order to absorb such skilled bias the
receiving country will be better off educating the proportion of unskilled labor to better
handle the newly introduced machinery, this will create new employment opportunities
for them as skilled workers hence will work to reduce income inequality.
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